

EPIMONE AND DIATRIBE:
DWELLING ON THE POINT
IN PS.-HERMOGENES*

Dedicated to Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. Hans Herter

In the *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* attributed to Hermogenes the term *διατριβή* appears under the heading *Περὶ περιπτότητος* (section 5) and is defined as the “*βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικῶν ἕκτασις, ἵνα ἐμμείνη τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ἀκούοντος.*”¹⁾

*) The following editions and standard works will be cited repeatedly throughout this study by the abbreviations indicated:

a. Editions

- Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica* – *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, ed. R. Kassel (Berlin 1976).
- Calboli–Cornifici *Rhetorica ad C. Herennium*, ed. with comm. by G. Calboli (Edizioni e saggi universitari di filologia classica, Bologna 1969).
- Caplan–[Cicero] *Ad C. Herennium de ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium)* ed. with trans. by Harry Caplan (Cambridge, Loeb ed. 1954).
- Halm–*Rhetores Latini Minores*, ed. C. Halm (Leipzig 1863).
- Hermogenes–*Hermogenis Opera*, ed. H. Rabe (Stuttgart, rep. ed. 1969).
- Peri methodou*–“Hermogenes”, *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* in Rabe’s edition of Hermogenes, 414–456. The author of this work will be referred to as Ps.-Hermogenes.
- Quintilian–*M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Libri XII*, ed. L. Radermacher (rec. V. Buchheit, Leipzig 1959), 2 vols.
- Rhetorica ad Herennium* or *Rhet. ad Her.*–[Cicero] *Ad C. Herennium de ratione dicendi*, ed. F. Marx (rec. W. Trillitzsch, Leipzig 1964).
- Spengel–*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel (3 vols., Leipzig 1854–1856; vol. I, pt. 2, ed. C. Hammer, Leipzig 1894).
- Walz–*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. C. Walz (9 vols., Stuttgart and Tübingen 1832–1836).

b. Standard Works

- Ernesti–*Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae*, ed. J. Ernesti (Leipzig 1795).
- Kennedy, *Roman*–George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B. C.–A. D. 300* (Princeton 1972).
- Lausberg–H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik, eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft* (2 vols., München 1960) – numbers given will refer to sections in volume I.
- Martin–J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik, Technik und Methode* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft II 3; München 1974).

1) Hermogenes 418. The tradition that Hermogenes wrote this treatise should be abandoned in view of E. Bürgi’s studies entitled “Ist die dem

The author illustrates his definition by quoting the opening sentence of Demosthenes' oration *Against Meidias* "τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, ἣ πρὸς ἅπαντας αἰεὶ χοῖται Μειδίας, οὐδένα οὐδ' ὑμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἀγνοεῖν οἶομαι," an expansion of the thought "τὴν μὲν ὕβριν Μειδίου πάντες ἴστε." The *prooimion* of Demosthenes' *On the Crown* is listed as a second example but not quoted.

The fact that *Peri methodou* is describing a rhetorical figure already was noticed by Johannes Ernesti in 1795 (p. 83). Ernesti gives *commoratio*, *excursio*, and *ἐπεισόδιον*, "quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia," as terms equivalent to *diatribe*²⁾ in various rhetorical writings, including the *Peri methodou*, and his identifications are followed by the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (*TLG*, Paris 1831–1865) in its article *διατριβή* (III 1359). Unfortunately, the widely-used Liddell–Scott–Jones *Greek English Lexicon*³⁾ did not follow the *TLG* in this instance and thus became the probable source for some later confusion, when it defined *diatribe* in *Peri methodou* as a "short ethical treatise or lecture" and quoted only four words of the Greek definition, *βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικῶ ἕκτασις*.

Perhaps the error in *LSJ* would have been of little importance, if Franz Susemihl had not also encountered *diatribe* in *Peri methodou* and cited the first half of the Greek explanation (up to *ἕκτασις*) to describe the *Diatribai* of Bion of Borysthenes⁴⁾. Susemihl refers to Walz's edition of the treatise (III 406),

Hermogenes zugeschriebene Schrift *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* echt?", in *Wiener Studien* 48 (1930), 187–197, and 49 (1931), 40–69. See also D. Hagedorn, *Zur Ideenlehre des Hermogenes* (*Hypomnemata* 8, 1964, 84–85; L. Radermacher, "Hermogenes", *RE* 8, 1, 872–873. I, therefore, will refer to the author of *Peri methodou* as Ps.-Hermogenes.

We should not ignore the possibility, however, that some of the material does go back to Hermogenes (cf. Bürgi, *WS* 1931, 69). Perhaps, as G. Kennedy has remarked (*Roman* 633), the work "contains genuine pieces of his theory loosely put together by some editor to supply a work whose existence was promised but not fulfilled."

2) Following the usual practice, I will treat all of the Latin and Greek names for rhetorical figures and technical terms as if they were English words. Most Greek terms, further, will be transliterated after their first appearance.

3) Revised ed. with supplement (Oxford 1968), 416, hereafter cited as *LSJ*.

4) *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexanderzeit I* (Leipzig 1891), 36, note 105. The first modern scholar to apply *diatribe* to the works of Bion (but not in connection with its use in *Peri methodou*) seems to have been H. Usener in *Epicurea* (rep. ed. Stuttgart 1966, LXIX); cf. E. G.

but prints ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις, instead of Walz's ἡθικοῦ ἑκτασις, a change which obviously alters the meaning. With this version in mind Susemihl wrote that diatribes are "nichtdialogische, und zwar wohl mehr oder weniger zwanglose kurze Aufsätze über ethische Themen." His exclusion of dialogue was criticized by Rudolf Hirzel and Theodore Burgess⁵), but neither of them corrected the misapplication of Ps.-Hermogenes' definition. Later, the direct influence of Susemihl appears in the work of G.C. Fiske and D.R. Dudley. Fiske sees the *diatribe* of Bion as "a short disquisition of informal character upon an ethical theme," and he quotes the first half of the definition from *Peri methodou*, using the reading ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις⁶). In his history of Cynicism Dudley writes "the definition of Hermogenes is worth quoting—*διατριβὴ ἐστὶ βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις* 'Diatribes is a moral exposition of some brief topic.'"⁷)

Dudley, like Fiske, cites Walz, III 406, despite the fact that ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις does not occur there, but rather seems to have come into circulation through Susemihl. More recently, C. J. de Vogel, possibly relying on Dudley (whom she mentions in her bibliography), continues the unfortunate traditions of citing only part of "Hermogenes'" definition and of employing the reading ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις⁸).

The misinterpretation of Ps.-Hermogenes' *diatribe*, however, is not limited to those influenced by Susemihl. For example, in his "Eclectisme philosophique et lieux communs: à

Schmid, "Diatribai", *Der kleine Pauly* II 1577. On the word as a title, see Susemihl, *loc. cit.*, O. Halbauer, *De diatribis Epicteti* (Dissertation Leipzig 1911), 5-7; J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes, A Collection of the Fragments with introduction and commentary* (Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11, Uppsala 1976), 23-25.

5) R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch* I (Leipzig 1895) 369, note 2; T. C. Burgess, "Epidictic Literature", *Studies in Classical Philology* III (Chicago 1902) 235. Burgess quotes the definition after Spengel's text (II 429), which has ἡθικοῦ ἑκτασις.

6) *Lucilius and Horace, a Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature 7, 1920; rep. Hildesheim 1966), 180. In his footnote on the Hermogenes definition (note 136, p. 215) Fiske cites Walz III, 406, who, as we have stated, does not have the ἡθικὴ ἐκθεσις. Since Fiske cites Susemihl (I 36, n. 105) in his note 133, the influence of the German scholar's citation may be taken for granted.

7) *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London 1937; rep. Hildesheim 1967), 111.

8) C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy, A Collection of Texts with Notes and Explanations*, III, *The Hellenistic Roman Period* (Leiden 1959) 318. De Vogel also refers to Walz III, 406.

propos de la 'diatribe romaine'" Alain Michel properly notes concerning "diatribe" that "les rhéteurs donnaient à ce mot un sens technique précis." He then continues, "il s'agissait d'une forme littéraire dans laquelle l'orateur répétait et développait une pensée fondée sur l' 'éthos' pour la graver dans l'esprit de l'auditeur; on voit qu'il s'agit plutôt de direction de conscience que de 'philosophie populaire.'"⁹) Michel refers to *TLG* (III 1359B) as his source, and he clearly is offering a paraphrase of the "Hermogenes" passage quoted there. The paraphrase is marred, naturally, by the insertion of the words "forme littéraire," which are not justified by the context of the Greek, and by the application of the description of the figure *diatribe* to the rhetorical genre commonly known as the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Another scholar, Michael Coffey, seems to have realized that the "Hermogenes" passage was not quite sufficient for a description of the genre, but he still neither quotes the full definition nor corrects the misconceptions concerning it. Coffey writes of *diatribe* that "the word was defined narrowly by Hermogenes, a Greek theorist of the second century A.D. as 'the development of a short ethical notion,' but it also comprised a wide range of moralizing discourse, reports of the teachings of various sages, anecdotes, and ready-made ethical judgements."¹⁰)

The one benefit that has resulted from the misunderstanding of Ps.-Hermogenes' *diatribe* is the stress on the ethical content of the genre *diatribe*. The absence of references to an interlocutor and the stress on brevity, however, can produce a distorted picture of the rhetorical form used by Bion, Teles, and others. For instance, Oswyn Murray has written of the diatribe that "its elements are short ethical discussions on a theme, rhetorically developed and provided with numerous examples; these could easily be combined to form longer treatises on a general topic."¹¹) Further, Murray thinks that some sections of "philosophical works *περὶ βασιλείας*" supply the best examples of the diatribe. We cannot digress here to indicate the merits

9) *Latomus* 70 (1964) 485, n. 1.

10) *Roman Satire* (London 1976), 92. Coffey's attitude seems to be close to that of E. J. Kenney (ed. Lucretius, *De rerum natura, Book III*, Cambridge 1971, 17), who cites the Greek definition, following Rabe's text, but notes of "diatribe" that "in practice it approached the status of a subliterary genre, one of a number of such genres of a generally homiletic type."

11) "Philodemus on the Good King According to Homer," *JRS* 55 (1965) 173. Murray does not mention Hermogenes.

and disadvantages of such a view, but we should note that the basic description, with its omission of the interlocutor and its emphasis on brevity, seems to be related to those notions of *diatribe* based on Ps.-Hermogenes.

Thus far in the present study we have seen examples of the misapplication of Ps.-Hermogenes' comments on *diatribe*, occasioned largely by disregard for the context in which the word appears in *Peri methodou*¹²). It remains now for us to investigate that context and to show that *diatribe* there is a rhetorical figure, unrelated to the genre *diatribe*. In order to prove our contention we shall show that the term occurs in conjunction with three other figures, which we shall attempt to identify, and that, on the basis of the illustrations given by Ps.-Hermogenes, *diatribe* seems to be the equivalent of the figure *ἐπιμονή*, "dwelling on the point."

Our first concern must be with the nature of the *Peri methodou* and of the section entitled *Peri perittotetos*, which contains the definition under investigation. Study of the treatise would be greatly facilitated, if we could assume that Hermogenes is the author and therefore refer back to his *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* as the final authority on all questions involving technical terms. Since it is unlikely that Hermogenes is the author (see note 1 above), however, even though some of the material may go back to him, we must be cautious about any assumption that certain passages in the *Peri methodou* rest on an Hermogenean basis. The contents of the treatise have aptly been described as "a series of disconnected chapters, on figures and other aspects of style,"¹³) and bear little resemblance to the careful order of a work such as

12) The most recent example of this common error seems to be G. L. Kustas, "Diatribes in Ancient Rhetorical Theory", *Protocol of the Twenty-Second Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture* (Berkeley 1976), 1-15 (cited hereafter as Kustas, "Diatribes"). Compare my remarks in the same volume, 27-32. In my dissertation, *A History of the Diatribe from its Origin up to the First Century B. C. and a Study of the Influence of the Genre upon Lucretius III, 830-1094* (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1974), which Kustas cites on 1, 4, and 6, I quoted *Peri methodou*'s complete definition and gave a brief analysis, pointing out that it is explaining a figure and has nothing to do with the genre "diatribe" (pp. 16-18 and 319, notes 10-15). Kustas (6-9) includes a partial translation and paraphrase of Ps.-Hermogenes' discussion of *diatribe* and of the remarks on that passage made by the 12th century commentator Gregory of Corinth, who also is mentioned by Ernesti (83). The text of Gregory's commentary on *Peri methodou* is in Walz VII, pt. 2, 1090-1352.

13) Kennedy, *Roman*, 633.

*Peri ideon*¹⁴). Among the chapters are found not only discussions of figures such as *epanalepsis*, *asyndeton*, and *antithesis* (Rabe's chapters 9, 11, and 15), but also comments on how to anticipate the opponent's "proposition" (chapter 23) and on the functions of deliberative speech, dialogue, comedy, tragedy, and the Socratic symposium¹⁵). The variety of the material included naturally leads us to wonder whether the title attached to it actually belongs to the work or merely reflects an attempt to supply a missing treatise by Hermogenes through the easy method of adding its title to an anonymous writing (cf. note 1 above). The passages of the *Peri ideon* where Hermogenes refers to a *Peri methodou deinotetos* have been collected and discussed by Bürgi (*WS* 1931) and Hagedorn (pp. 84-85), who have demonstrated a lack of correspondence between the references in *Peri ideon* and the contents of *Peri methodou*. In fact, a perusal of Bürgi's studies leaves one with the impression that little can be characterized as exclusively Hermogenean in *Peri methodou*. Further, although, as Bürgi (*WS* 1931, p. 54) has observed, we cannot know precisely what an ancient work on stylistic *deinotes* would have contained, still *Peri methodou deinotetos* does not seem to merit its title. There is no discussion of the meaning of *deinotes*, and several of the chapters, such as 1-3, seem to have no place in a study of the forceful style¹⁶). What we probably do have here is an incomplete work which takes what coherence it has from the author's tendency to use a catechistic style and from the predominance of rhetorical figures among its topics¹⁷). Thus, we should not take it for granted that our definition of *diatribe* appeared in a finished treatise delineating only figures or concepts related to *deinotes*, but we need not rule out any connection between the figure and the stylistic form.

14) On this point see especially Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 188-197.

15) Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 191-192, lists and partly translates the thirty-seven headings of *Peri methodou*. Rabe's edition varies slightly in that it does not include heading number 6.

16) Both Radermacher (see note 1 above) and Bürgi (*WS* 1931, 61) have called attention to the fact that the term *deinotes* occurs only once in the treatise (in addition to its inclusion in the title). References to chapters and sections of *Peri methodou* which do not seem to belong to a discussion of *deinotes* are to be found in Bürgi (*WS* 1931) 55 ff.

On the concept of *deinotes* in Hermogenes, cf. Hagedorn, 33-41; L. Voit, *ΔΕΙΝΟΤΗΣ, ein antiker Stilbegriff* (Leipzig 1934), 54-67.

17) The catechistic style of the treatise is analyzed by Bürgi (*WS* 1930), 192-193. In his 1931 (*WS*) study, p. 55, Bürgi mentions the prevalence of "Sinnfiguren", which he listed in his 1930 (*WS*) article (191-192).

Problems concerning the title of the work, however, need not affect the discussion of our next point, which is the significance of the designation *Peri perittotetos* which heads section 5 of *Peri methodou*. The term *perittotes* seems to denote a quality or characteristic of style, probably related to *auxesis* or *amplificatio*, but it does not correspond to any one of the virtues or forms of style listed by authorities on rhetoric. Rather, it seems to be a subcategory which fits under one or more of the virtues and serves a descriptive or organizational purpose, perhaps in the same fashion as the heading *Περὶ τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ* in Phoibammon (Spengel III, 46), under which we find the figures *periphrasis* and *epimone* listed. The Byzantine commentator Gregory of Corinth thought that *perittotes* was a kind of *περιβολή*, not identical with that Hermogenean form, but “lying beneath it.”¹⁸ He remarks (1146.10–11), “ἰστέον δὲ, ὡς ἢ κατὰ λέξιν περιπτότης κατὰ τὸν Ἑρμογένην μέθοδος ἐστὶ τῆς περιβολῆς, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτης λόγῳ φησίν.”

Although the word *perittotes* does not occur anywhere in Hermogenes' discussion of *peribole* in *Peri ideon*, the adjective *perittos* (in the form *περιπτῶ*, p. 279) and the verb *περιπτεύει* (p. 286) do. Thus, Gregory may have inferred a connection between *perittotes* and *peribole* from the use of *περιπτῶ* and *περιπτεύει*, and from the fact that *perittotes*, like *peribole*, is related to *auxesis*. We, however, should remember that Gregory thought that he was commenting on a genuine work by Hermogenes and that he therefore turned to the *Peri ideon*, when he needed a category under which he could fit *perittotes*. Unlike Gregory, we cannot take Hermogenean authorship of the *Peri methodou* as a

18) Walz VII, pt. 2, 1147, 2–6. *Vide* Kustas, “Diatribē”, 11, who cites Gregory (1147) and refers to *peribole* as *Amplitude*, a translation which he also uses in his *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Analekta Blatadon 17, Thessalonike 1973, 13). I prefer the translation “amplification” (*LSJ* 1370), which better indicates the nature of the form and its connection with *auxesis* (on which consult Hagedorn, 46–47).

Concerning the date of Gregory of Corinth and his tendency to indulge in “oft etwas kritiklos und eilfertig zusammengetragenes Material”, see B.A. Müller in *RE* 7, 1849–1850; cp. H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* I (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 12, 5.1; München 1978), 84–85.

The recension and origin of Gregory's work is discussed in T.F.A. Gerber, *Quae in commentariis a Gregorio Corinthio in Hermogenem scriptis vestigiorum commentariorum vestigia deprehendi possint* (Dissertation Kiel 1891), 7ff., on which see Hammer, *Berlin. Phil. Wochenschrift* 10 (1873), 456–458, and *RE* 7, 1850.

rationale for postulating a relationship between *perittotes* and *peribole*, but neither must we reject the possibility that Gregory's disposition has some validity. The scholiast defines *perittotes* (1147.1-2) as "τὸ παρελκόν καὶ ἢ περίσσεια καὶ ἢ περιβολὴ τῶν λέξεων καὶ τὸ ταῖς αὐταῖς λέξεσι χρῆσθαι", a description which is broad (and vague) enough to cover the contents of Ps.-Hermogenes' section 5, in which no specific definition of the term is given. If, on the basis of the figures listed as parts of it, we grant that *perittotes* is compatible with Gregory's definition, then we may say that this quality and its figures could have been subsumed under *peribole*. What we cannot prove, lacking an authority other than Gregory, is that they all were ever so classified.

Perittotes in *Peri methodou* generally has been translated into English as "redundancy" (cf. *LSJ*, 1387), perhaps under the influence of Ernesti's rendering of the term as "*redundantiam dictionis*" (261). Redundancy, however, has a rather negative connotation and would be a suitable translation only if the author were depicting a stylistic fault, which he clearly is not doing. There are, of course, words associated with bad style which share the root *perissos* with *perittotes*. For instance, Quintilian (8, 6.61; cf. Lausberg 593) mentions *περισσολογία* as a *vitium* contrasting with *periphrasis*. Demetrius (5.247; cf. Lausberg 1073), further, provides us with the term *περισσοτεχνία*, when he warns of the danger involved in using *antitheses* and *paromoia* in periods, if one is striving for *deinotes*. Both of these examples convey the notion of "too much" of something, however, while *perittotes*, as a chapter heading, is the common denominator, so to speak, of figures which are redundant or "superfluous" only in the sense of being nonessential for the meaning of a passage.

Perittotes may be closer than the other two words to the positive rhetorical connotation of *perittos*. When found in discussions of style, *perittos* can have a variety of meanings ranging from "unusual" to "richly-wrought," but it generally implies the use of "grand diction."¹⁹ From a reference in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Isocrates* 3; cf. Hagedorn, 46) we see that Theophrastus mentioned the production of "τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ

19) For these connotations *vide* W.K. Pritchett (ed.), *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides* (Berkeley 1975), 143, note 5; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963), 276; W. Rhys Roberts (ed.), *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition, Being the Greek Text of De Compositione Verborum* (London 1910), 316 (cited hereafter as Roberts, *Dionysius*).

περιττὸν ἐν λέξει," and this collocation of terms would seem to link *perittos* with the high style²⁰). A similar link is evident, when Dionysius writes of Thucydides, "νῦν δὲ περὶ μὲν τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἔστιν ὅτε διαμαρτάνει, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν οἷς ἂν τὴν ὑψηλὴν καὶ περιττὴν καὶ ἐγκατάσκεινον διώκη φράσιν..."²¹) Further, the same critic notes the absence of anything *semnon* or *peritton* in the style of Herodotus I, 8-10²²), and observes that Demosthenes "ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδιωτικοῖς λόγοις" employs "τὴν κοινὴν καὶ συνήθη λέξιν," and seldom uses "τὴν περιττὴν καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτην ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ, ἀλλ' ὥστε λαθεῖν"²³). The inclusion of "περιττὴν ἀπεριττον" (*Demosthenes* 8; cf. Hagedorn, 37), finally, in a list of opposites that are blended in the style of Demosthenes shows that *perittos* can denote the elaborate, as opposed to the simple or *aperittos* style.

Demetrius also indicates a connection between *perittos* and the high style. In his discussion of τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές (38 ff.) he says (77) that the diction in this type of style ought to be *peritten* and "ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον" since this produces "τὸν ὄγκον"²⁴). Longinus, on the other hand, does not give an explicit statement linking *perittos* and the grand style, but we may draw some information from two of his remarks. The first of these comes in a passage dealing with τὸ μειρακιῶδες (3.4), when the author writes that this affectation is produced by those reaching for "τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ πεποιημένου καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἡδέος..."²⁵).

20) The text is from the edition of H. Usener and L. Radermacher (Leipzig 1899), page 58.4. All quotations from the works of Dionysius will be drawn from this edition. With regard to page 58.4, Hagedorn, 46 (cf. 23), cites Cicero, *Orator* 79, where the Roman orator (quoted here from the edition of Pleis, Stuttgart 1963) observes that the plain style lacks "quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus: ornatum illud suave et affluens." We should add here Cicero's description of the orator in the grand style (*Orator* 97) as "amplus copiosus, gravis ornatus, in quo profecto vis maxuma est."

21) *De comp. verborum* 18; cp. Roberts, *Dionysius*, 182; Ernesti, 261. See also G. Wille, "Zu Stil und Methode des Thukydides", in *Thukydides*, ed. Hans Herter (Wege der Forschung 98, Darmstadt 1968), 687, and note 23.

22) *De comp. verborum* 3; cf. Roberts, *Dionysius*, 83-84.

23) *Demosthenes* 56; see also Ernesti, 261.

24) Ed. W. Rhys Roberts (Cambridge 1902). Concerning this passage *vide* Hagedorn, 45, and Ernesti, 261.

25) The text is that of D. A. Russell (Oxford 1968). I have not tried to include here all of the references to *perittos* in ancient rhetorical or literary sources. Instead, I have endeavored to give representative examples of the term found in circumstances which may help us to determine its significance.

Later (40.2), in dealing with “*σύνθεσις*” and “*τὸ μέγεθος*”, Longinus observes that even those using words that are common and provide nothing *peritton* have come to possess loftiness (*ὑγκον*), distinction, and “*τὸ μὴ ταπεινοὶ δοκεῖν εἶναι*” through their employment of “*τοῦ συνθεῖναι καὶ ἀρμόσαι*” (cf. Ernesti, 261). On sorting out the meaning underlying the contrasts in these two passages, we see that *perittos* again is connected with the high style, although loftiness, etc., may be achieved without it.


It is possible that *perittotes* was developed as a formal expression, when rhetoricians needed a noun to characterize the stylistic quality with which *perittos* was involved. We can only speculate about such a development, for a line from *perittos* to *perittotes* has not been mapped out for us in ancient sources. Obviously, a relationship between the two could stem from the connection that *perittos* has with the grand style, which allows the expansion and elaboration that is the essence of *perittotes*. Perhaps, then, we may take our cue from the use of *perittos* to denote an elaborate style and translate *perittotes* as “elaboration”, in the sense of changing something simple into something more complex²⁶.

Now that we have noted the possible origin and meaning of the term *perittotes*, we may briefly survey the contents of the section which it heads. Ps.-Hermogenes begins his discussion (417) by stating that *perittotes* is twofold (*διπλῆ*), namely “*καὶ κατὰ λέξιν καὶ κατὰ γνώμην*”, and that each of these divisions also is twofold, being divided according to *λέξιν* and *γνώμην*. Next, *διατριβή* and *πλήθος* are given as components of the second group “*κατὰ λέξιν*”, while the second division “*κατὰ γνώμην*” is characterized as (418.1–2) “*κατὰ ἐπενθυμίσεις καὶ λόγων καθολικῶν τοῖς ἰδίοις συμπλοκήν*” (to which we shall refer hereafter as *epenthymesis* and *katholikai logoi*). When considered as a whole, these classifications seem quite muddled. We have *perittotes* separated into “diction” and “thought”. Then, “diction” apparently is subdivided into “diction” and “thought”, and “thought” likewise is given similar subgroups. At this point the division

26) Kustas, “Diatribe”, 7, translates *perittos* as “abundance”, a rendition which also conveys the nature of the word. I have chosen “elaboration”, because it seems to suggest the connection between *perittos* and amplification and implies an active principle.

On the relationship between *perittos* and *perittotes*, consult Ernesti, 261, who puts his brief discussion of *perittotes* within his section on *perittos*.

seems to break down utterly or to duplicate itself in an unlikely way. If we interpret the Greek text at face value, we must then come up with a distribution that resembles the following diagram:



The author may have envisaged a grouping such as this²⁷⁾, or he may simply have overindulged a fondness for subdividing his material. Misinterpretation of a source also may have been a factor in this passage. At any rate, the first division by *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen* may hark back to something like Hermogenes' arrangement of his discussion of each stylistic "idea" under the rubrics "ἔννοια" and "λέξεις"²⁸⁾. The second grouping, on the other hand, seems to be an instance of the common separation of figures into those of diction and those of thought. The word *schemata* does not occur, but the author may have deemed it unnecessary.

As I mentioned above, under *kata lexin*, which I view as a division containing figures of diction or speech, are grouped *diatribe* and *plethos*. *Epenthymesis* or "the insertion of corroborative arguments" (*L&SJ* 617) and *katholikai logoi* then are figures of thought placed under the heading *kata gnomen*. In referring to these terms as figures we should bear in mind A. D. Leeman's warning that "the catalogue of the figures of speech is the most

27) We might think that Ps.-Hermogenes intended for *diatribe* and *epenthymesis* to come under the *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen* divisions, respectively, which are subsumed under the first *kata lexin* group. Then, he might have put *plethos* and *katholikai logoi* under the *kata lexin* and *kata gnomen*, respectively, of the first *kata gnomen* division. Such a classification, however, is a rather strained interpretation of the Greek text.

28) Regarding this division see Hagedorn, 19-20. On 20, Hagedorn records the use of *gnome* by Ps.-Aristeides in a fashion similar to Hermogenes' employment of *ennoia*. Gregory of Corinth (1146.1-2) identifies *gnome* with *ennoia*.

chaotic and controversial department of the ancient doctrine of style.”²⁹) Thus, something like *epenthymesis* which may not seem like a figure of thought to us, and, indeed, may not have been one in the opinion of some rhetoricians, seems to have been considered a figure by our author and must be treated as such in our investigation.

The figure of primary interest for us, of course, is *diatribe*. We shall pass over it for the moment, however, and examine the three other figures in our passage. The first of these is *plethos*, a figure of diction defined as the “*ποικίλων ὀνομάτων ἰσοτίμων ἐπίχρσις εἰς κίνησιν ἥθους*” (418.10). For his example Ps.-Hermogenes turns to Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* 12, “*τοῦ δὲ παρόντος ἀγώνος ἢ προαίρεσις αὐτῆ ἐχθροῦ μὲν ἐπήρειαν ἔχει καὶ ὕβριν καὶ λοιδορίαν καὶ προσηλακισμόν ὁμοῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*” (418.11–14). Here the orator clearly has “poured forth” a string of words which share bad connotations and are intended to produce an unfavorable impression of his opponent’s character, apparently thereby fulfilling the conditions for a *kinesin ethous*. In view of this example we might have expected some reference to *pathos* as well as *ethos*. Although Demosthenes is depicting the character of his opponent, and incidentally holding himself up as an injured party of good repute, the overall effect of the piling up of such nouns in polysyndeton is emotional. Gregory of Corinth, in fact, mentions “*τὸ κινῆσαι πάθος*” (115.2.20) in discussing this passage, although it is obvious from another reference (115.3.4) that his text of *Peri methodou* also read *κίνησιν ἥθους*³⁰). Ps.-Hermogenes, however, tends to stress “character” whenever he can, and we shall return to this notion later in studying the use of “*ἠθικοῦ*” in the definition of *diatribe*.

The identification of *plethos* as a figure depends chiefly on the interpretation of the words “*ποικίλων ὀνομάτων ἰσοτίμων*”, which can be explained with near certainty on the basis of another section of *Peri methodou*. Immediately preceding the section on *perittotes* there is a passage bearing the heading “*Πότε ταντότητι ὀνομάτων χρῆσόμεθα καὶ πότε ποιικιλία*”. There Ps.-Hermogenes concludes that if one word, used repeatedly, will suffice to provide the clearest account, then there is no need for an

29) *Orationis Ratio, The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators, Historians, and Philosophers* I (Amsterdam 1963), 33.

30) Emendation of Gregory’s *πάθος* to *ἥθος* might be defended on paleographical grounds, but it is likely that the commentator simply noticed the emotional nature of the instance cited and thus mentioned *pathos*.

abundance of words. If, on the other hand, one has many words that are of equal value (*ισότημα*) and will equally serve to produce vividness (*ἐνάργειαν*), then a variety (*ποικιλία*) of words is suitable (416.8ff.). The repetition of one term is illustrated by Homer, *Odyssey* 19.205–208, where we find “κατατήκετ’”, “κατέτηξεν”, “τηκομένης”, and “τήκετο”, all variations of the same root verb. More important for our purposes are the examples of *poikilia* taken from Homer and Thucydides. In the Homeric illustration occur synonymous adjectives (*ὄξύ*, *δοιμύ*, *πικρός*) emphasizing the sharpness of pain, as the poet writes (*Iliad* 11.269–272),

ὡς δ' ὅταν ὠδίνουσαν ἔχη βέλος ὄξύ γυναικα,
δοιμύ, τό τε προῖεῖσι μογοστόκοι Εἰλείθυιαι,
Ἕρης θυγατέρες πικρός ὠδῖνας ἔχουσαι,
ὡς ὄξει' ὀδύναι δῦνον μένος Ἄτρεΐδαο.

The example from Thucydides, differing from the Homeric one, does not feature synonyms in close proximity, but, rather, notes their use at varying intervals within a long section of the work. Citing book 1, sections 1.3, 8.1, and 2.6, as well as one sentence based on 5.3 but different from the received text, Ps.-Hermogenes observes that in his prologue Thucydides employs “τεκμήριον, σημεῖον, παράδειγμα, μαρτύριον, καὶ ἀεὶ κύκλον ποιεῖται τῶν ὀνομάτων” (416.7–8). From the instances given we may infer that words which are called *poikila* and *isotima* in *Peri methodou* are sufficiently close in meaning to warrant denotation as synonyms. *Plethos*, therefore, by definition, is the pouring forth of different but synonymous words which contribute to the production of an impression of character. It is interesting to note that, unlike simple *poikilia*, *plethos* is attached to *ethos* rather than to *enargeia*, although the pouring forth of synonyms is vivid.

Now that we have clarified the definition of *plethos*, we shall investigate whether the figure is identical with any better-known device or has its origin in the *Peri methodou*. For the most part, *plethos* has remained unexplained and ignored. Ernesti, for instance, identifies *diatribe* (83) with *commoratio* and other figures (see above at note 2), but for *plethos* he only quotes the definition from Ps.-Hermogenes with no elaboration. Further, Volkmann³¹), Lausberg, and Martin make no mention of the term.

31) R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht* (Leipzig 1885).

In his commentary on Demosthenes' *On the Crown* (Demosthenes, *Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz*, Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu grie-

Gregory of Corinth is of a little more help. That commentator first equates the phrase “διατριβῆ καὶ πλήθει” (*Peri methodou* 417.19ff.) with “ἐπιμονῆ καὶ ἐγχερονισμῶ καὶ συναγωγῆ” (1146.17–18). Then, several pages later (1153.1–3), he observes that *plethos* differs from *diatribe* “ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῃ μὲν κατὰ κῶλον γίνεται ταυτότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ κατὰ λέξιν”. Gregory’s distinction may have some validity, and so we shall explore briefly the theory that *plethos* is some type of *epimone*.

As will be indicated presently in this study, in our discussion of *diatribe*, *epimone* or “dwelling on the point” has several forms which have been categorized by Lausberg. Most of the rhetoricians who mention the figure class it as a figure of thought, although Julius Victor (Halm 433.33) and Tiberios (Spengel III, 74) list it as a figure of diction, while Phoibammon (Spengel III, 47 and 50) includes *epimone* under both kinds of figures³²). Generally, *epimone* is seen as a figure of speech when it relies on individual words for its development, and as a figure of thought when phrases or sentences give it form (cf. Lausberg 838). This distinction was not always observed by rhetoricians, however, and it should not worry us if we must compare a figure of diction such as *plethos* with a type of *epimone* designated as a figure of thought (see above at note 29).

The descriptions of *epimone* which come closest to fitting *plethos* occur in the treatises of Phoibammon (Spengel 47), Tiberios (Spengel 74), Alexander (Spengel 17–18), and the anonymous *Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου σχημάτων* (Spengel 147), cited hereafter as *Anonymous I*, to distinguish it from the anonymous *Περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου* (Spengel 176), which we shall call *Anonymous II*. Phoibammon, first of all, defining his figure of diction as the “προφορὰ πλειόνων λέξεων ἐπίσης τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνουσῶν, ἢ καὶ λόγων”, gives examples of *epimone* based upon single words and longer phrases. Significant for our investigation is the kind founded on “λέξεων”, illustrated by the sentence, “ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐρρύσατο ἀπὸ συμπλοκῆς, ἀπὸ μάχης, ἀπὸ τραυμάτων,

chischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern, Heidelberg 1976; cited hereafter as Wankel), I 168, H. Wankel discusses the motive of railing at an enemy in Demosthenes’ section 12 and notes the citation of the passage in *Peri methodou* as a “Paradebeispiel für eine Synonymenreihe im Dienst der *δείνωσις*”. He also does not identify the figure.

³² The rhetoricians whom we shall quote in discussing *epimone* (*commoratio*), here and later in this study, are listed by Lausberg (838) and Martin (135, note 3). Texts for the Greek authorities, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Spengel III; cf. Walz VIII.

ἀπὸ αἰμάτων.” The four prepositional phrases obviously are related in that each refers to some aspect of battle. They do not, however, contain synonyms.

A similar situation obtains in one of the examples of *epimone* (as a figure of diction) appearing in Tiberios, who writes that the figure occurs whenever someone puts more words directly upon one another. After citing an instance using only verbs, the rhetorician adds his second example (Spengel 74), “ψῆφον αἰτεῖ, ὄρκον αἰτεῖ, νόμον αἰτεῖ, δημοκρατίαν αἰτεῖ”. Here, as in the illustration from Phoibammon, we have nouns which are related and deal with the same subject, but cannot be considered synonyms. Two of Alexander’s examples of *epimone* as a figure of thought come nearer to *plethos* in that the words involved are closer in meaning than those in the other illustrations cited above. The first of these is a quotation from Euripides and features the series of nouns τροφός, μήτηρ, ἀδελφή, δμῶις, ἄγκυρα and στέγη, all in asyndeton. For his second example Alexander turns to Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 43 (cf. Walz VIII, 441), for a passage which observes that the Thessalians and Thebans considered Philipp of Macedon a “φίλον, εὐεργέτην, σωτήρα”, another occurrence of related words in asyndeton. Differing somewhat from Alexander’s illustrations, an example of *epimone* formed by single words in polysyndeton appears in the treatise which we are citing as *Anonymous I* (Spengel 147). Demosthenes again is the author’s source (*On the Crown* 298; cf. Walz VIII, 655) and the quotation reads in part, “οὔτε καιρός οὔτε φιλανθρωπία λόγων οὔτ’ ἐπαγγελιῶν μέγεθος οὔτ’ ἐλπίς οὔτε φόβος οὔτ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐπῆρεν...” None of the sentences cited by Alexander or *Anonymous I*, however, contains words which are entirely *isotima* in the sense required by the *Peri methodou* for *plethos*. Certainly, τροφός, μήτηρ, ἀδελφή and δμῶις have much in common, but they are not synonyms and definitely not equivalent to the remaining two terms, ἄγκυρα and στέγη, no matter how metaphorically we may interpret the sentence. In a similar fashion, the three nouns describing Philipp are related but not identical in meaning, while the words in *On the Crown* 298 are even farther removed from one another. Thus, although all of these instances of *epimone* seem to resemble *plethos* in their abundance of related terms, we must conclude that the two figures are not precisely the same. *Plethos* requires a synonymy which is not absolutely essential for *epimone*. Further, and perhaps more important, the definition of the former lacks any notion of “dwelling on the point”, pre-

ferring to stress "character". We should not ignore the possibility, however, that *plethos* could be employed with *epimone*, especially if *epimone* is a figure of thought. Quintilian, in fact, observes that figures of thought and speech "frequentissime coeunt" (9, 1.16), and here we do have two figures with enough in common to allow them to go together.

Since we have rejected the identification of *plethos* and *epimone* suggested indirectly by Gregory of Corinth, we must look to figures involving synonymy or enumeration for an equivalent for *plethos*. The best selection of these is in Quintilian, 9, 3.28 ff., whose comments have been schematized by Lausberg (607-687). After discussing what we would call grammatical figures (9, 3.1-27; cf. Lausberg 605) Quintilian writes, "illud est acrius genus, quod non tantum in ratione positum est loquendi, sed ipsis sensibus tum gratiam tum etiam vires accommodat" (9, 3.28). The first kind of these is composed of figures made by addition or repetition ("adiectio" or "per adiectionem") and it encompasses figures ranging from *geminatio* (9, 3.28) to *gradatio* or *climax* (9, 3.57). Within this group are mentioned figures which involve the enumeration of *synonyms* or of unrelated words (9, 3.45-50), as well as asyndeton (*dissolutio*, 9, 3.50) and polysyndeton (9, 3.51-54).

Of primary interest to us is the passage concerning synonyms. Quintilian has been dealing with cases in which parts of sentences are repeated, when he adds (9, 3.45) that sometimes "initia quoque et clausulae sententiarum aliis, sed non alio tendentibus verbis inter se consonant." Agreement among the ends of sentences is exemplified by "vos enim statuistis, vos sententiam dixistis, vos iudicastis." Then the rhetorician comments that some call this "*συνωνυμίαν*", while others call it "disiunctionem", either of which is correct, since "est nominum idem significantium separatio". Still discussing synonyms, Quintilian next states that words which mean the same thing also "congregantur". Illustrations of this phenomenon are provided by "quae cum ita sint, Catilina, perge quo coepisti, egredere aliquando ex urbe: patent portae, proficiscere" and "abiit, excessit, erupit, evasit." These examples resemble those usually given for the figure *synonymia*, which, like *plethos*, involves words of similar meaning.

Martianus Capella provides the most concise Latin definition of *synonymia*, describing it as a "communio nominis, quotiens uno verbo non satis dignitatem rei aut magnitudinem de-

monstramus, ideoque ad eandem significationem plura conferimus" (41.535; Halm 482; Lausberg 650). While this rhetorician does not cite an example of the device, Aquila, whose definition is essentially the same, quotes the sentence "prostravit, adflixit, perculit" (Halm 34; Lausberg 655; Martin 308). Isidore of Seville, further, gives two examples from Cicero, which state "nihil agis, nihil moliris, nihil cogitas" and "non feram, non patiar, non sinam" (2, 21.5; Halm 518; Lausberg 650). In Alexander (Spengel III, 30.14) we also encounter an illustration based on verbs, a shortened version of a sentence from "Demosthenes" *Πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν Φιλίππου* (153.3-4), which includes the verbs *γινώσκειται*, *οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται* and *ὑποπτεύεται*. Alexander's definition is rather specific, maintaining that *synonymia* occurs whenever, wanting to show one and the same thing, we use more words which differ in character but which do show the same thing by their meaning (*τῆ δυνάμει*). From this definition we can see that an absolute identity of meaning may not be required, but the words in the figure must have connotations similar enough to allow them to "show the same thing." Thus, while *γινώσκειται* and *οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται* are essentially identical in meaning, *ὑποπτεύεται* differs slightly, but still comes under *synonymia*, since "suspect" or "suppose" also contains some notion of "recognition." This same latitude allows a series like "prostravit, adflixit, perculit" to be classed as *synonymia*, even though there is a slight variation in the exact meanings of the verbs. We should note that the synonymy of the verbs in the illustrations cited is closer to the idea of *isotima* than is that of the nouns in the instances of *epimone* cited above. The fact that all of the examples of *synonymia* which survive in rhetorical works are composed only of verbs and never rely on a series of nouns, however, prevents us from identifying *synonymia* and *plethos* as definitely the same figure, although they must be considered close relatives³³).

33) Related to *synonymia*, and sometimes equated with it, is *interpretatio*, defined by the *Rhet. ad Her.* 4, 28.38) as "quae non iterans idem redintegrat verbum, sed id commutat, quod positum est, alio verbo, quod idem valeat, hoc modo:

'Rem p. radicitus evertisti, civitatem funditus deiecisti.' Item: 'Patrem nefarie verberasti, parenti manus scelerate attulisti.' "The relationship between this figure and *epimone* is obvious.

Calboli (365) follows Lausberg (727) in seeing *interpretatio* as "un isocolon con cola sinonimi." There is no evidence in the definition, however, to indicate that *isocola* are required for the figure. It seems likely that the author simply included examples in which *isocola* and *interpretatio* appear together, just as, for instance, *isocolon* and *homoeoteleuton* are found in con-

If we return now to Quintilian, we find references to two other figures which belong within the same family as *plethos*, but which, again, cannot be identified with it. In 9, 3.47, after his description of *synonymia* and some comments on pleonasm, the rhetorician observes that “nec verba modo, sed sensus quoque idem facientes acervantur.” His example is “perturbatio istum mentis et quaedam scelerum offusa caligo et ardentis furiarum faces excitaverunt.” For obvious reasons, specifically the use of phrases and the emphasis on similar thoughts rather than words, this unnamed figure cannot be taken as the equivalent of *plethos* or employed to show that some form of *synonymia* utilized strings of nouns.

The second figure cited by Quintilian in this section involves the accumulation of words that are “diversa” (9, 3.48). This concept is illustrated first by the sequence “mulier, tyranni saeva crudelitas, patris amor, ira praeceps, temeritatis dementia.” As a second example, Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* 5, 17–19, is quoted as follows:

sed grave Nereidum numen, sed corniger Ammon,
et quae visceribus veniebat belua ponti
exsaturanda meis.

Quintilian does not name this figure. Instead, he simply denies that it is called “*πλοκήν*”, since “sit unius figurae” (9, 3.49). Instances cited by other writers, however, allow us to identify the figure as *συναθροισμός*, which Alexander (I, 9; Spengel III, 17.13–14; Martin 308) defines as the “*συναγωγή τῶν πεπραγμένων ἢ πραγθῆναι δυναμένων εἰς ἐν κεφάλαιον*”³⁴). Rutilius Lupus (I, 2; Halm 4; Lausberg 671), for example, writes that *synathroismos* can be made by “et singulis verbis et plurium verborum coniunc-

junction in the illustrations of *homoeoteleuton* (4, 28.20). Cf. Quintilian 9, 3.45, where *disiunctio* and *synonymia* occur.

We are not concerning ourselves in the present study with the relationship of one rhetorical treatise to another. On some aspects of this topic consult G. Ballaira, “Una figura inedita del *περὶ σχημάτων* di Alessandro di Numenio e le sue affinità con Quintiliano (Inst. 8, 6, 67–76)”, *RhM* 119 (1976) 324–328, and T. Schwab, *Alexander Numenii ΠΕΡΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ in seinem Verhältnis zu Kalliklos, Tiberios und seinen späteren Benützern* (Rhetorische Studien 6, Paderborn 1916).

34) The presence of *synagoge* in this definition holds some interest for us, since Gregory of Corinth (1146.17–18) employs the same term in his description of *diatribe* and *plethos*. See above after note 31.

Martin (307) observes that “der *συναθροισμός* will verschiedene Dinge, die *συνωνυμία* aber gleiche Dinge zum Ausdruck bringen”.

tionem." For one of his examples of *synathroismos* in *singulis verbis* Rutilius turns to Demochares and the remark "nam quis haec simul universa perpeti possit, timorem, morbum, senectutem, contumeliam, inopiam, vim? quarum quaevis una res per se satis est gravis ad deficiendum." Certainly this kind of enumeration corresponds to Quintilian's, with its use of nonsynonymous nouns in asyndeton, but it does not fit the requirements of *plethos*. *Synathroismos* has more than one form, however, and often is identified not only with *enumeratio* but also with *distributio* (cf. Lausberg 671; Calboli 404-405). Further, in Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.7; cf. Lausberg 675), whose *synathroismos* seems closest to *distributio*, we encounter the illustration "δῆμοι στασιάζοντες, καὶ πόλεις καὶ γένη ἡγνόμενα, καὶ οἰκίαι διῶσάμεναι." Here the nouns all describe aspects of the same entity, and they reveal a much nearer relationship, as parts of a whole, than do even the terms in Alexander's second example of *epimone* quoted above, which refer back to Philipp. Zonaios' nouns are, thus, essentially synonymous, and, if they were not tied up with the notion of distribution, they would allow us to assume that some kinds of *synathroismos* do involve synonyms and may be identical with *plethos*.

This possibility cannot be excluded altogether, despite Quintilian's reference to *verba diversa*. There is, however, a figure resembling *synathroismos* which may resolve some of our difficulties. In book 8, 4.3-28, Quintilian discusses *amplificatio*, noting that it is produced by "incremento, comparatione, ratiocinatione, congerie" (4.3). Concerning the fourth type of *amplificatio*, the rhetorician writes that the "congeries quoque verborum ac sententiarum idem significantium" can be included under *amplificatio*, for even if "non per gradus ascendunt, tamen velut acervo quodam adlevantur" (8, 4.26). Quintilian's example, built of sentences with similar meanings, comes from Cicero (*Pro Lig.* 3.9), and reads, "quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, dextricus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? cuius latus ille mucro petebat? qui sensus erat armorum tuorum? quae tua mens, oculi, manus, ardor animi? quid cupiebas? quid optabas?" (8, 4.27). The fact that this collocation of sentences dwells on one point shows how closely related *epimone* and various forms of accumulation or enumeration can be, with one figure used to help make another³⁵). Especially important for our purposes, though, is the

35) On the relationship between *epimone* and *synathroismos*, cp. Lausberg 675 and Alexander (Spengel III, 22.22 ff.) on *epitrochasmus*.

sentence which follows this example. There Quintilian comments, “simile est hoc figurae, quam *συναθροισμὸν* vocant, sed illic plurimum rerum est congeries, hic unius multiplicatio.” Influenced by this statement some modern commentators, such as Volkmann (451), Lausberg (667), and Calboli (404), have treated *synathroismos* and “congeries” as if they were the same figure. That may have been the case for a Greek rhetorician such as Zonaios, whose example of *synathroismos* could illustrate either *distributio* or *congeries* (cf. Lausberg 667 and 671), but for Quintilian the two apparently are similar but distinct. Further, we should note, notwithstanding modern usage, that Quintilian’s figure is not called *congeries*. Quintilian is writing about a kind of amplification produced by “congerie”, but he does not explicitly call any figure *congeries*. For the sake of convenience, however, we shall continue to refer to the unnamed figure as *congeries*.

Whatever the proper name for *congeries* may be, the figure itself is a likely candidate for identification with *plethos*. In fact, the link between *congeries* and *amplificatio* reminds us of Longinus’ remark that “... κείται τὸ μὲν ὕψος ἐν διάματι, ἢ δ’ αὖξινος καὶ ἐν πλήθει” (12.1, ed. D. A. Russell; cf. Lausberg 406). The phrase “ἐν πλήθει” is not a technical use of *plethos*, but its appearance with *auxesis* could indicate that the name of the figure *plethos* ultimately stems from phrases descriptive of amplification. If this were the case, then *congeries* and *plethos* would be essentially the same thing expressed in different languages. We cannot demonstrate such a relationship, however; we can only suggest it.

Unfortunately, Quintilian does not actually illustrate an accumulation of individual words of similar meaning, and his inclusion of “mens, oculi, manus, ardor animi” does not provide us with a list of true synonyms. We, therefore, can merely theorize, on the bases of Quintilian’s definition, of the resemblance between *synathroismos* and *congeries* and *synathroismos* (in form) and *plethos*, and of the correlation of the terms *plethos* and *congeries*, that *plethos* might be one kind of *congeries*. Such an identification is plausible, but it leaves out of consideration the multiple connectives occurring in the example of *plethos*. The definition does not mention those conjunctions, but elsewhere in *Peri methodou* (427.4) we encounter *plethos* again used in a section where polysyndeton appears. The author is discussing asyndeton and an unnamed alternative which obviously is polysyndeton. In distinguishing between the two devices he writes (427.2 ff.), “ταῦτὸν δ’ ἐργαζόμενα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μετὰ συνδέσμων

πραγματικὸν πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος, οἷον "Ὀλυμπον μὲν δὴ καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ Θράκης ἔω", τὸ δὲ ἄνευ συνδέσμων λεγόμενον ἡθικὸν ἔστι "καὶ πάλιν ἡνίκα Πύδνα, Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, Παγασαί, τἄλλα, κτλ." *Plethos* could be employed here in an utterly nontechnical way, especially since it is accompanied by the word *megethos*³⁶). Further, it is odd that *plethos* is connected with *ethos* in 418.11, but opposed to *ethikos* here. Still, the utilization of the term in two instances where polysyndeton and an accumulation of single nouns turn up seems hardly accidental, all the more since one might think of the city names in the second occurrence as essentially equal words, even though they are not synonyms for each other. Even in its nontechnical usage, then, *plethos* might be viewed by Ps.-Hermogenes as somehow joined to polysyndeton. If we accept this connection as a possibility, then we may turn to Quintilian for additional help in identifying *plethos*. In another part of his discussion of figures created *per adiectionem* the rhetorician deals with asyndeton and polysyndeton (9, 3.50-54; cf. Lausberg 686). His examples of polysyndeton are followed by the remarks, "sed utrumque horum acervatio est aut iuncta aut dissoluta," and "omnibus scriptores sua nomina dederunt, sed varia et ut cuique fingenti placuit." Further, "fons quidem unus, quia acriora facit et instantiora quae dicimus, et vim quandam prae se ferentia velut saepius erumpens adfectus" (9, 3.53-54). It seems probable that the author of *Peri methodon*, a work allegedly connected with *deinotes*, the equivalent of *vis*, resembles those writers who invent names for various figures. In addition, the notion of an "acervatio" developed through polysyndeton agrees well not only with the basic concept of *plethos* but also with amplification and *congeries*. Thus, our best course would seem to be to assume that *plethos*, as a figure made *per adiectionem*, related to, or identical with, some form of *congeries* (itself an "acervatio"), is one of those figures cited by Quintilian which uses an accumulation of words, in its case, "of synonyms", to produce "vim". The *plethos-congeries-polysyndeton* relationship, then, might be compared

36) Place names and the term *megethos* connected with polysyndeton occur earlier in Demetrius II 54 (cf. Lausberg 686), who uses *Iliad* II 497 as his example. That critic observes that the names of the Boeotian towns there have "μέγεθος διὰ τοὺς συνδέσμους ἐφεξῆς τοσοῦτους τεθέντας".

Further, in II 63 (cp. Lausberg 686) Demetrius gives another instance of proper names in polysyndeton and states "ἢ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συνδέσμου θέσις ἐμφαίνει τι ἄπειρον πλῆθος." This is another nontechnical usage of *plethos*, but it does give us some idea of the connotations of the word.

to the *synathroismos-congeries-asyndeton* relationship, with the first two figures of each group nearly identical and often appearing separately in conjunction with the third.

The next figure mentioned in the section of *Peri methodou* under investigation in the present study is *epenthymesis*, which is defined as “ἐνθύμημα ἐπιφερόμενον, ὃ μὴ προστεθὲν μὲν οὐ ποθεῖται, προστεθὲν δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὠφελεῖ” (418.15), that is, as an argument which is nonessential but which is a helpful addition³⁷). The purpose of *epenthymesis* is to soften “τὰ ἥδη”, when the arguments being presented are harsh and remorseless. Obviously, τὰ ἥδη here has to refer to the nature of the arguments (*διανοήματα*), rather than to the characters of the speaker or his audience.

The term *epenthymesis* may be the result of an attempt by Ps.-Hermogenes to name a practice described by Hermogenes in the *Περὶ εὐρέσεως* (III, pp. 152–154; cf. Martin 104)³⁸). There the author presents the *ἐπενθύμημα*, a second *enthymeme* which is “invented” in addition to one that has preceded it (152.10ff.). In citing an example, Hermogenes takes as a theme the sentence “in fact the king dug through Mount Athos.” He then forms an *enthymeme* which states, “and indeed, while he dug through a mountain, a more difficult deed, we, on the other hand, shall dig through the earth, an act that is not difficult.” A second *enthymeme*, the *epenthymeme*, follows, remarking “and indeed he dug in order to gain some advantage, but we will dig so that we may not be surpassed and suffer harm.” According to Hermogenes, this second *enthymeme* is invented “ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας” and added (*ἐπιφερόμενον*) to the first one. There is no reference to the “softening” mentioned by *Peri methodou*. Instead, Hermogenes comments later (153.16–20) on a situation in which, when one *enthymeme* is not complete in itself, another is added as a supplement to provide a “περιττοτέραν δομότητα” (cf. Martin

37) Although *Peri methodou* refers only to an *epenthymema*, not to more than one, Gregory of Corinth (1147.14; cf. 1148.9) thinks that the figure involves the addition of two or three other *enthymemes*; compare Hermogenes, *Περὶ εὐρέσεως*, 152.6–9. On the tradition of the *enthymeme* as a figure, see note 43 below.

38) Concerning the doubtful authenticity of this treatise, *vide* Kennedy, *Roman*, 626–628; Radermacher, 873–877.

Kennedy (626) observes that in book III, “the author is not interested in proof in the way Aristotle was, but in amplification and the arrangement of material.” This interest seems to be shared by the author of *Peri methodou*.

104). The use of the adjective *perittoteran*, of course, makes us think of *perittos*, but the meaning here seems to be "more acute" or "more striking", rather than "more elaborate". At any rate, if the author of *Peri methodou* drew on Hermogenes in developing the concept of *epenthymesis*, he did not follow that rhetorician entirely, for the idea of "softening" seems to be his own addition and contrary to the notion of creating a "more striking keenness". Ps.-Hermogenes seems to have taken the *epenthymema*, which is a form of argument in *Peri heuruseos*, and designated its use in a certain fashion as a figure of thought. As his example, he cites, but does not quote, the opening of Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides 2, 35, where, in his opinion, the thought "οὐκ ἔδει λέγεσθαι ἐπιτάφιον" has been softened by *epenthymesis* (418.19-25).

Closely associated with *epenthymesis* is the second figure of thought, *katholikoi logoi*, since occurrences of the two devices are found "side by side", as in Thucydides 2, 35 (418.19). Further, while *epenthymesis*, as we noted above, functions as a "softener" of harsh arguments, *logoi* which are "koinoi" and "katholikoi" are employed for the proof of "ἰδίων λόγων" (418.22), and so also have a place in argumentation. Gregory of Corinth (1154.20ff.; cf. Ernesti 165) has identified the figure *katholikoi logoi* for us, stating that it is clear that "γνώμας τοὺς λόγους πάντες τοὺς καθολικὸν ὀνομάζουσι." According to Gregory, Theophrastus said that *gnome* is the "καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις". The term ἀπόφασις here obviously must be the alternate spelling of ἀπόφανσις, which means "statement" (cf. *LSJ* 226), rather than the ἀπόφασις which denotes "negation" and does not correspond with Gregory's description of *gnome*. While the commentator does not tell where Theophrastus mentioned *gnome*, we can easily trace Theophrastus' source. In his *Ars Rhetorica* (II, 1394a21) Aristotle defines *gnome* as "ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἴφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων, ... ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτὰ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν", a definition upon which Theophrastus must depend³⁹). The connection of *gnome* with "ka-

39) Gerber, 39, note 2, writes concerning Gregory (1154.24ff.) that even if this fragment does not seem to render Theophrastus' words "integra", it must be connected with his *περὶ γνώμης* or with his art of rhetoric. See in addition G. Rosenthal, "Ein vergessenes Theophrastfragment", *Hermes* 32 (1897) 317-320; Kassel's edition of Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica*, p. 119.

tholou” found in Aristotle and Theophrastus had a continuing tradition which undoubtedly led to the use of *katholikoi logoi* in *Peri methodou* to designate what must be *gnomai*. For instance, when, in his section on *chreias* (*Progymnasmata* 5, Spengel II, 96), Theon lists differences between the *chreia* and the *gnome*, he remarks (96.27–29) that “ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν χρεῖαν, τὴν δὲ γνώμην καθόλου μόνον.” Further, Nicholas Sophistes (*Progymnasmata* 4; Spengel III, 463.25; cf. Lausberg 1121) writes “τὴν γνώμην ἀπόφασιν εἶναι βούλεται καθολικῆν...” The definition of primary importance for our investigation, however, is that found in the *Progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes. There we encounter *gnome* explained as a “λόγος κεφαλαιώδης ἐν ἀποφάνσει καθολικῆ ἀποτρέπων τι ἢ προτρέπων ἐπὶ τι ἢ ὅποιον ἕκαστόν ἐστι δηλῶν” (p. 8.16–18; cf. Lausberg 1121). No direct link between these three *Progymnasmata* and *Peri methodou* need be shown here, for it is evident that the relationship between *katholou* or *katholike* and *gnome* has a long tradition which would permit an identification of *katholikoi logoi* with *gnome* or *gnomai*.

There are also precedents for the classification of *gnome* as a figure. For example, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* includes a figure of diction called *sententia* and defines it as an “oratio sumpta de vita, quae (a)ut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit” (4, 17.24)⁴⁰. Further, according to that treatise, there is a “genus sententiae, quod confirmatur subiectione rationis,” which is illustrated by the sentence “omnes bene vivendi rationes in virtute sunt conlocandae, propterea quod sola virtus in sua potestate est, omnia praeterea subiecta sunt sub fortunae dominationem” (4, 17.24). The Aristotelian origin of this doctrine is clear (cf. *Ars Rhetorica* II, 1394a29ff.), although the topic undoubtedly went through numerous treatments before reaching the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Two rhetoricians, Cornelius Celsus and Visellius, who classed the use of *gnomes* as a figure of thought are cited by Quintilian (9, 2.104 and 107), who disapproves of such a classification⁴¹). Celsus

40) Cp. Lausberg 872. Quintilian (8, 5.3) writes that “antiquissimae sunt, quae proprie, quamvis omnibus idem nomen sit, sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant”. In a later passage (8, 5.7) the rhetorician mentions the term *katholika* with reference to a type of *gnome* or *sententia*.

On *sententia* in Quintilian cf. J. Cousin (ed.), *Quintilien, Institution Oratoire*, Tome 5 (Collection des Universités de France, Paris 1978), 290–291; D. M. Kriell, “The Forms of the Sententia in Quintilian, VIII, 5, 3–24”, *Ant. Class.*, 4 (1961), 80–89.

41) In 9, 3.98, Quintilian mentions figures of thought listed by Cacci-

probably was not a professional rhetorician and seems to have based his discussion of figures on the work of Rutilius Lupus⁴²). Among the devices which he called figures is found the "pro-verbiis uti". Visellius, who, in Quintilian's opinion, also errs, even though he "paucissimas faciat figuras," puts *sententia* into his list of figures, which, interestingly enough, also includes *enthymeme*. To these references to the figure *sententia* may be added Isidore of Seville, who lists *sententia*, a "dictum impersonale," among the figures of thought⁴³). Thus, although the stronger tradition seems to have excluded *sententia* or *gnome* from the figures of diction or thought, there did exist another tradition which apparently influenced Ps.-Hermogenes into making a figure out of *katholikai logoi*. Also, the existence of a figure named *enthymeme* seems to indicate a possible precedent for the creation of the figure *epenthymesis* in *Peri methodou*.

The connection between the *gnome* and the *enthymeme* also has a long history, stemming from Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica*. In the lines following the definition of *gnome* which we quoted above Aristotle writes (1394a 27-29) that the conclusions and beginnings of *enthymemes* are more or less *gnomai*, when they are looked at by themselves (i.e. out of the context of their rhetorical syllogism). For example, the *gnome*

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος

helps to form an *enthymeme*, when it is joined to the phrase,

ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἔστιν ἢ τύχης⁴⁴).

lius and Cornificius. The writer then excludes *sententia*, *membrum*, *articulus*, *interpretatio*, and *conclusio* (all included by Cornificius) from the figures, thereby indicating that he does not consider *sententia* a figure of any sort. Concerning this passage, see Caplan, 288, note b.

42) *Vide* Kennedy, *Roman*, 484-485, who also notes that Rutilius Lupus took examples from Gorgias of Athens.

43) 2, 21.14, in Halm 519. Isidore then discusses the "sententiarum species multae", 2, 21.16ff. See also 2, 9.11, where this compiler refers to the "sententiale" *enthymeme* "quod sententia generalis adicit", and 2, 11.1.

For the inclusion of *enthymeme* among the figures, consult Rufinianus 30 (Halm 45); *Rhet. ad Her.* 4, 18.25 on *contrarium*, and Caplan, 292, note b. Both of these rhetorical works follow the tradition of the *enthymeme* as an argument drawn from contraries, on which see Lausberg 371; Martin 102-106.

44) 1394b 4-6. The second line is from Euripides, *Hecuba* 864; cf. E. M. Cope (ed.) *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary* (revised by J. E. Sandys, 3 vols., Cambridge 1877; cited hereafter as Cope, *Rhetoric*) II 207; W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Hermes Einzelschriften 25, 1972), 80-81.

Aristotle continues his discussion by presenting various kinds of gnomes, but they need not concern us here, since *Peri methodou* does not mention any of them.

We have already noted one apparent continuation of this Aristotelian tradition, that is, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4, 17.24). To this may be added Quintilian (8, 5.3-4; cf. Lausberg 872), who says of the type of *sententia* which can be classed as a *gnome*, "hanc quidam partem enthymematis, quidam initium aut clausulam epicheirematis esse dixerunt, et est aliquando, non tamen semper". Further, "illud verius, esse eam aliquando simplicem, ut ea, quae supra dixi; aliquando ratione subiecta." This connection of *gnome* and reason seems closely related to the species of example given in the Aristotelian passage cited above, but Quintilian may also want to show that not every such connection produces an *enthymeme*. Elsewhere, however, the Roman writer specifically describes one form of *enthymeme* as a "sententiam cum ratione" (5, 10.1-2). Later experts on rhetoric knew of a "sententiale" or "gnomikon" *enthymeme*, which seems to have developed from the concept of the "sententiam cum ratione." For instance, Isidore of Seville (2, 9.11; Halm 512; cf. Lausberg 872) mentions the *sententiale* type, while Fortunatianus (2, 29; Halm 118) lists *gnomikon* among his "genera enthymematum". C. Iulius Victor even provides a distinction between the gnomonic *enthymeme* and the "sententia", commenting (11, 34; Halm 412), "sed enthymema gnomicon hoc a sententia differt, quod ibi tantum simpliciter sententia pronuntiatur, hic autem simul et ratio sententiae redditur" (cf. Martin 103-104). Even though all of these are Latin writers, they still reflect the joint Graeco-Roman tradition. Thus, we should not be surprised to find *epenthymeme* (or *epenthymesis* in this case) and *katholikoi logoi*, the "descendants" of *gnome* and *enthymeme*, connected in *Peri methodou*.

There remains, certainly, the question of how close a relationship is implied by "παράλλᾳξ". In order to answer this, we must turn to the example cited by Ps.-Hermogenes, which is the beginning of the funeral oration delivered by Pericles in Thucydides 2, 35. Apparently *Peri methodou* assumes that the theme of this section is "οὐκ ἔδει λέγεσθαι ἐπιτάφιον" (418.25), and it wants to show how this view is softened and proved through the use of the figures *epenthymesis* and *katholikoi logoi*. It would be helpful, of course, if Ps.-Hermogenes had told us how he defines *enthymeme*. We cannot really tell from his description of *epenthymesis*

whether he considers the *enthymeme* a rhetorical syllogism with one or more parts suppressed or an argument from contraries⁴⁵). If he actually is following the Hermogenean *Peri heurseos*, which has the only extant discussion of *epenthymeme*, and which features examples of *enthymemes* based on the *μὲν...δέ* construction, then we should expect him to be an adherent of the “contraries” or “antithetical” view of the *enthymeme* or at least to cite examples involving contrasts. If we look for these contrasts, we can produce a scheme of “arguments” in Thucydides 2, 35, which seems to be what *Peri methodou* calls *epenthymesis*. According to this scheme, the first “enthymeme” would be the whole of 35.1. Here Pericles observes that, while *οἱ μὲν πολλοί* have praised the person who established the law adding a speech to the funeral ceremony, he himself thinks it sufficient that, since men have been good “*ἔργω*”, then honor should be paid them “*ἔργω*”. Further, the courage of many men should not be “risked” on the basis of one man’s speaking ability (or lack of it)⁴⁶. Section 35,2 then must contain the *epenthymeme*, which Ps.-Hermogenes deems necessary to soften the effects of the *enthymeme*. Thus, we may take as our supplementary *enthymeme* the passage which begins by stating that it is difficult to speak in due measure, when the appearance of truth is hardly established. To this remark is joined the contrast which forms the *enthymeme*⁴⁷), as

45) For a full discussion of the forms of the *enthymeme*, *vide* Martin 101–107; Lausberg 371. The Aristotelian *enthymeme* receives convincing treatment in Grimaldi, 47–135. Thucydides’ use of the *enthymeme* is mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his *Thucydides*, chapter 24 (p. 362 in Usener–Radermacher). Cp. Pritchett, 17 and 96–97; Wille, 687.

Regarding Aristotelian influence on later theories of the *enthymeme* and *epicheireme*, consult F. Solmsen, “The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric”, in *Kleine Schriften* II (Hildesheim 1968), 194–203. Something of the notion of opposition found in the *enthymeme* as an argument from contraries may also be derived from Aristotle. As Grimaldi has shown (78), the “general topic of opposites (B 23, 97a7ff.)... is the first general topic for enthymemes given by Aristotle which might indicate that he finds the quality of opposition of some importance for the *enthymeme*”. See also 80–81 (on *gnome* and *enthymeme*).

46) I am following the edition by H.S. Jones (Oxford, rep. 1966), and obviously I have compressed the argument here, while retaining its essential parts. On the authenticity of this speech and its sentiments, see especially Hans Herter, “Zur ersten Periklesrede des Thukydides”, in his *Kleine Schriften* (ed. E. Vogt, München 1975), 214–222.

47) Cf. Hermogenes, *P. heurseos*, 153.22–25, where there appears the *enthymeme* “*χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν ὁ πολίτης ἀδικῶν τοῦ πολεμίου, ὅτι ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ γένος συγγνώμην ἔχει, ὁ δὲ ἐπιτείνει διὰ τὸ πολίτης εἶναι τὸ μισεῖσθαι*”.

Pericles warns that the listener who is knowledgeable and well-disposed probably would think that what is being set forth is something rather inferior to what he wishes and knows. On the other hand, continues Pericles, the listener who is unacquainted with the facts thinks, because of his envy, that there has been exaggeration, if he hears something “ὕπερ τῆν αὐτοῦ φύσιν”. Appended to these remarks is another contrast, which *Peri methodou* may have considered a second *epenthymeme*. Here the Athenian statesman notes that panegyrics spoken about other people are sufferable to the extent that each one feels himself competent to do something of what he has heard, but “τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν.” The passage then ends with a comment (35.3) expressing the speaker’s intention to obey the law by delivering the eulogy, since the custom was approved by “τοῖς πάλαι”.

The above analysis has shown how Thucydides 2, 35.1–3, could have been reduced to *enthymemes* and *epenthymemes* by the author of *Peri methodou*. Further, there are obvious examples of *katholikoi logoi* in this passage. For instance, the second *epenthymeme* could stand on its own as a *gnome*. The remark about envy in the first *epenthymeme* also has the nature of a “general truth”⁴⁸), as does the phrase “ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θραπτομένοις ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν”, which occurs in the opening *enthymeme*. Thus, we see that not only do *katholikoi logoi* and *epenthymesis* stand “parallax” in the sense of “side by side but distinct”, but they also are “side by side” in the sense that gnomic statements form parts of the *epenthymemes*. *Parallax*, then, can imply as close a relationship as that between *enthymeme* and *gnome* in Aristotle’s *Ars Rhetorica*. Further, the second *epenthymeme* in the Thucydidean passage seems to be an instance of the combination of a *gnome* with a reason, which typifies the form given in Aristotle and reflects the kind cited by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and C. Iulius Victor, as quoted above.

With this description of *epenthymesis* and *katholikoi logoi*, we complete our study of the three other figures which are discussed in section 5 of *Peri methodou*, where *diatribe* appears. It should be evident now that *plethos*, *epenthymesis*, and *katholikoi logoi* are

48) A. W. Gomme (ed.), *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, II (Oxford 1956), 103, observes concerning this passage that “it is always dangerous to generalize about a people, but no body of men has ever been so *conscious* of envy and its workings as the Greeks”.

rhetorical figures in the opinion of Ps.-Hermogenes, and that there is a tradition which allows these devices to be so termed. In addition, all three figures definitely provide some form of amplification or elaboration. *Plethos* creates its effect through the use of a variety of synonyms. In *epenthymesis* elaboration is created by appending a second argument or *epenthymeme* to one already stated but expressing a harsh sentiment. Finally, the device called *katholikoi logoi* augments by supplying a general truth which, in combination with more specific remarks (the “λόγων καθολικῶν τοῖς ἰδίῳις συμπλοκή”), helps to convince the listener. With the characteristics of these three figures established, we now may turn our attention to a detailed investigation of *diatribe*, which should resemble the devices surrounding it in *Peri methodou* in that, like them, it is a figure and a form of elaboration.

Since we already have quoted the definition of *diatribe* from *Peri methodou* in the first paragraph of the present study, we need not repeat it here. Further, we pointed out above that *diatribe*, like *plethos*, is classed under *kata lexin*, which we have interpreted as a classification covering figures of diction. Now we shall investigate the examples of *diatribe* cited by Ps.-Hermogenes and try to determine on the basis of them and of certain key terms in the definition precisely what sort of figure *Peri methodou* is describing.

Looking for key terms within the definition we encounter first the word “ἐκτασις”, which may be literally translated as “a stretching out” or even as a “lengthening” (*LSJ* 321), rather than simply an “expansion”. The noun is a technical term in rhetoric and grammar, and turns up in discussions of rhythm and the lengthening of syllables. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for instance, writes of the “ἐκτάσεις” and “συστολάς” of words⁴⁹). We also find the term in more technical rhetorical works, such as the *Περὶ τρόπων* of Tryphon. There *ektasis* is listed under *pleonasmus* (lengthening) and defined as a “λέξις ἐκτεινομένη παρὰ τὸ σύνθητες, οἷον καλῆσι, θέλησι, δῶσι” (Spengel III, 198.8). *Ektasis* in *Peri methodou*, however, is not connected with the lengthening of syllables. It is not impossible that the word has been taken over from discussions of vowel length and then used some-

49) *De comp. verborum* 25; p. 268.19 in Roberts' edition. The verbal forms “ἐκτείνεται” and “συστέλλεται” are in chapter 14 (Roberts, 140.18) in a discussion of vowels. Cf. Ernesti, 99, who cites additional examples of the use of *ektasis* and *ekteino*.

what metaphorically, but we can find a more likely origin for its utilization, if we look at two related verbal forms occurring in the *progymnasmata*. First of all, in its section dealing with myths, the *Progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes observes that it is necessary “αὐτοὺς ποτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνειν, ποτὲ δὲ σοστέλλειν”. The author then gives his instructions for “extending” and shortening the presentation of a myth (p. 2.111–3.14). Interestingly enough, at the close of the example of “ekteinein” (3.12) there appears the verbal form “διατερίβων”, obviously referring to the way in which the extending is to continue⁵⁰). Another writer of *progymnasmata*, Theon, employs forms of the verb “ἐπεκτείνειν”, when he delineates ways of expanding the *chreia*. Theon writes that we extend (ἐπεκτείνομεν) the *chreia*, whenever we lengthen (μηκύνομεν) the questions and answers or some deed or feeling contained in it (Spengel II, 103.28–30; cf. Lausberg 1119). Ps.-Hermogenes’ *diatribe*, of course, is not directly connected with either myth or *chreia*. The appearance of forms of *ekteinein* and *epekteinein* in discussions involving extension, and thus, in fact, expansion, in these two exercises, however, suggests that *ektasis* in *Peri methodou*, connected as it is with the “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικοῦ”, owes its utilization to a tradition related to the technical usage of its kindred verbal forms. Somewhere in this tradition *ektasis* must have assumed a connotation of lengthening associated not with the value of syllables, but with amplification or elaboration.

As important as *ektasis* in the definition of *diatribe* is the phrase “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικοῦ”, which establishes the kind of extension involved in the figure, namely, the lengthening of a “brief moral thought” (cf. Kenney as cited in note 10 above). It is possible, however, that the adjective *ethikos* implies more than just “moral” here. Ps.-Hermogenes clearly views *diatribe* as a device which helps the speaker win his audience’s favor. We see this factor in the second half of the definition, which we shall discuss presently. The emphasis on the orator’s character suggests that *ethikos* may also have some connotation of character, rather than only the meaning “moral”. Thus, we might come closer to our author’s view of *diatribe*, if we render the phrase “βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθικοῦ” as “of a brief thought show-

50) See C. S. Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Various Works* (Gloucester, Mass., 1959), 24, who renders *diatribon* here as “dwelling on the incidents”.

ing moral character". Since this translation is rather cumbersome, however, we shall substitute the rendering "of a brief ethical thought", where the English cognate is understood to encompass both the idea of "moral" and the notion of character. The change is slight, but it does provide a nuance which may be in keeping with other uses of *ethos* and *ethikos* by Ps.-Hermogenes (cf. 418.10 and above after note 30)⁵¹).

A stronger emphasis on character occurs in the second half of the definition with the concept of "τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος" remaining in "τῆ γνώμη τοῦ ἀκούοντος". The phrase "τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος" has its own long tradition, extending back to Aristotle's stress on the need for an orator to establish his good character in the eyes of his audience, and it may have become something of a *topos* by the time of *Peri methodou*⁵²). Both of the illustrations cited by Ps.-Hermogenes give clear indications of the working of this concept. Conspicuous in the basic thought ("all know the arrogance of Meidias") and in the developed form of the prologue to Demosthenes' *Against Meidias*, the first of the examples, is the emphasis on the bad character of Meidias. Reference to Meidias' nature is an ethical thought, with both of the connotations of the word *ethikos*, and allows the speaker to show what we might term "moral indignation" at the behaviour of his opponent (cf. Gregory of Corinth 1151.23 ff.). This indignation then creates a favorable impression of the character of the orator, who is depicting himself not only as the victim of his enemy's excesses, but also as a "right-thinking" person who, along with

51) For instance, *Peri methodou* uses *ethikos* in its discussion of asyndeton (427). Again, in section 20, the ἠθικὸς ὄρκος is delineated (435-436). I will provide a more detailed investigation of *ethikos* in *Peri methodou* in a future study.

The precedents in rhetorical literature for interpreting *ethikos* as "expressive of character" or "of moral character" are too numerous to list here, ranging from Aristotle on to Cicero (*Orator* 37.128), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (especially in his *Lysias*), Ps.-Aristides, and Hermogenes. Valuable surveys of the topic are provided by J.F. Lockwood, "HΘΙΚΗ ΑΕΞΙΣ and Dinarchus", *CQ* 23 (1928) 181, and W. Süss, *Ethos, Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik* (Leipzig 1910). See also Solmsen, 203-204; E. Schütrumpf, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes ethos in der Poetik des Aristoteles* (Zetemata 49, München 1970); A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Hypomnemata 38, Göttingen 1973).

52) On the "ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος" cp. Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica* I, 1356a 1 ff., and II, 1395b 13 ff.; Grimaldi, 61-62; Hellwig, 251-257 and *passim*; Martin, 96-97, 158 ff., 257; *Rhet. ad Her.* I, 4-5 and Caplan, 14, note a; Süss, 150 ff.; *Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου* (Anon. Segner.), Spengel I, 439.3.

the “good men” judging his case, strongly disapproves of such behaviour.

When we turn to the second illustration, we again find evidence for the importance of the speaker’s character in Ps.-Hermogenes’ view of *diatribe*. In the opening section of *On the Crown* Demosthenes tries to win the goodwill of his audience through two prayers, which stress first his own goodwill and then the obligation of the judges to consider the laws of Athens and their oath to hear both sides equally. Through these prayers the orator provides a classic example of an introduction which aims at securing the favor of the listeners by creating a good impression of the speaker as an honest man⁵³). Further, this *prooimion* fits well into the category of introductions described by Quintilian as taken “ab actore”. That rhetorician notes concerning a speaker (4, 1.7), “quamquam enim pauciora de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur.” Quintilian’s remark suits our Demosthenes passage, since the orator does say little about himself in it, but he uses indirect means, notably prayers, to convince the judges that he is a man of sterling character. Thus, we must acknowledge the importance of the idea of the good character of the speaker in both of the illustrations and in the definition of *diatribe*. It is this emphasis on the orator’s character which makes it quite obvious that *diatribe* in *Peri methodou* is not the same thing as the Cynic-Stoic *diatribe*, which dispenses moral philosophy in a popularized form, but which cannot be said to have the creation of a favorable impression of the speaker’s character as a primary aim.

As a result of our investigation of the key words in the definition of *diatribe*, the predominance of the concepts of ex-

53) Wankel I, 105–106, observes that of the preserved Attic speeches only the *Leocratea* of Lycurgus begins with a prayer, although some fragments also show evidence of prayer. We should also take note of the invocation to the Muses at the beginning of Socrates’ speech in *Phaedrus* 13, 237a. See below at note 66.

The *Τέχνη ἑπτολογική* of Rufus (Spengel I, 463.23–464.4) quotes the opening of *On the Crown* as an example of a prologue drawn “ἀπὸ προσώπου, ἥτοι τοῦ ἰδίου, ὅταν ἑαυτοῦς συνιστῶμεν”. Further, the beginning of the speech *Against Meidias* is cited by him (I, 464.4–8) as an instance of a prologue drawn from the opponents (*ἀντιδίκων*).

Hermogenes also uses *On the Crown* 1 as an example, including it in his description of the ethical oath (*Peri id.* 327.2–3).

On Demosthenes’ “Akzentuierung seines ἦθος” cf. Wankel I, 106 and 145–146.

pansion and of creating a favorable impression has become obvious. The importance of character may be unique to Ps.-Hermogenes and may not have been a standard feature of the figure *diatribe*. We already have seen how *Peri methodou* describes *plethos* in terms of the "moving of character". Further, the author sees *epenthymesis* as a device used to soften the nature of harsh thoughts, a notion seen to occur nowhere else. We, therefore, should not be astonished, if we find that *diatribe* in other writers maintains its connection with "expansion" and with keeping something in the mind of the audience, but loses its ties with character, when it is viewed as a figure. Before pursuing this facet of *diatribe*, though, we shall briefly consider what Ps.-Hermogenes means by the extension of a brief ethical thought.

As was noted earlier, *diatribe* is a figure of speech for our author. Thus, we would expect that its creation would depend on words rather than on thoughts, although the word "thought" appears in its definition. Verbal expansion is evidently what is illustrated by the example from the speech *Against Meidias*. There, instead of stating only that "all know the arrogance (*hybris*) of Meidias," Demosthenes has expanded that simple thought through the addition of "ἀσέλγειαν", almost synonymous with "ἔβρον", through the use of the clause "ἢ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ χοῦται Μειδίας", instead of just "Μειδίον", and, finally, by writing "οὐδένα οὐδ' ἡμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἀγνοεῖν οἶμαι", rather than "πάντες ἴστε". All of these extensions of individual words or short phrases involve changes in words rather than thoughts. Analysis of the second instance of *diatribe* is less simple, for *Peri methodou* does not tell us what it considers the underlying thought or how much of the opening of *On the Crown* it regards as the *prooimion*. Gregory of Corinth (1152.15 ff.) seems to have thought that only the following section of the introductory sentence was meant⁵⁴): "Πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις, ὅσῃν εὖνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ἡμῶν εἰς τοντονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα..." Possibly the Byzantine commentator was trying to make the illustration from *On the Crown* have a brevity equal to that of the example from *Against Meidias*. Citing only this

⁵⁴) I am quoting here from the text of Demosthenes, *On the Crown*, ed. G. Mathieu in *Demosthenes, Plaidoyers Politiques* IV (Collection des Universités de France, Paris 1947), which is the text that I shall follow in discussing the oration. Gregory's text contains insignificant differences.

part of the *prooimion*, however, is not satisfactory, for the syntax of the sentence is not taken into account. After the word *agona* which concludes the section quoted by Gregory, the passage continues, “ἐπειθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάλισθ’ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας τε καὶ δόξης, τοῦτο παραστήσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, μὴ τὸν ἀντιδικὸν σύμβουλον ποιήσασθαι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ δεῖ (σχέτλιον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτό γε), ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸν ὄρκον, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἅπασιν τοῖς ἄλλοις δικαίοις καὶ τοῦτο γέγραπται, τὸ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν ἀκροάσασθαι.” The verb εὐχομαι, which appears in the first part, governs this section as well, a factor which seems to indicate that we should view the thoughts in both segments as a connected whole. Thus, the underlying *dianoema* would be something like “may heaven inspire the assembly to give me such a trial as my merits deserve and impartial justice dictates,”⁵⁵ or, put less elegantly, “I pray that your good will may be equal to mine and that you may avoid prejudice and obey the law.” The idea that this sentence, and perhaps even the shorter one following it (section 2), should be taken as a unit is reinforced by the occurrence of a condensed repetition of it in *On the Crown* 8, noted by Holmes and Tyler (115; cf. Wankel, 145; note 55), who refer to the *prooimion* as “a solemn prayer reiterated shortly after (8).” In 8 Demosthenes states “...βούλομαι πάλιν τοὺς θεοὺς παρακαλέσαι, καὶ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν εὐχομαι πρῶτον μὲν, ὅσῃν εὐνοίαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ’ ὑμῶν εἰς τουτοῖ τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἐπειθ’ ὅ τι μέλλει συνοίσειν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν κοινῇ καὶ πρὸς εὐσεβείαν ἐκάστω, τοῦτο παραστήσαι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν περὶ ταυτησὶ τῆς γραφῆς γνῶναι.” This remark not only is an instance of “ring composition” used within an oration. It also shows us what section 1 might have looked like without some of the expansions that make it an illustration of *diatribe*. For example, the phrase “τοῖς θεοῖς ... πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις” is missing, as is all of the portion on the juryman’s oath. We shall discuss the expansion of the basic thought in sections 1 and 8 presently.

The assumption that our example of *diatribe* must include both sections 1 and 2, however, does produce one difficulty. If *diatribe* is a figure of diction, it seems odd that it should encom-

55) This compression appears in *The De Corona of Demosthenes, with English Notes*, ed. Rev. Arthur Holmes, revised by W.S. Tyler (7th. ed., Boston 1885), 115.

Regarding the importance of the opening vocatives and the “πρῶτον μὲν”, and for parallels in other speeches of Demosthenes, consult Wankel I, 107–108. Wankel I, 111, also notes the *topos* in “τοσαύτην ... ὑμῶν”.

pass so large a segment without affecting the thought. We should remember, first, though, that the often blurred distinction between figures of thought and of diction in antiquity would allow Ps.-Hermogenes to class a figure, whose lengthy development would make us want to call it a figure of thought, as a figure of speech (see above at note 29). Further, many of the amplifications in 1 and 2 are verbal and do not alter the basic thought, although they strengthen it. We should not forget, finally, that the word "brief" in the definition of *diatribe* refers only to the thought and not to its expansion. Thus, parts 1 and 2 may be treated as the example meant by *Peri methodou*, when it cites the *proimion* of *On the Crown*, without concern for the illustration's length. With these aspects in mind, we now shall try to determine whether *diatribe* may be identified with any known rhetorical figure.

An attempt at identification of the figure is made by Ernesti (83), whose remarks on *diatribe* were quoted above at note 2. Of course, the devices which he lists are not precisely equivalent. *Commoratio* or "dwelling on the point", the Latin term for *epimone*, might be a part of a digression (*excursio* or *epeisodion*), for instance, but, according to rhetorical theory, the figure is not a digression, but rather a means of emphasizing an important point. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De oratore* support this view. For example, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* defines *commoratio* as "cum in loco firmissimo, a quo tota causa continetur, manetur diutius et eodem saepius reditur" (4, 45.58). Further, this figure prevents the audience from removing its attention "de re firmissima," and its *locus* is not "a tota causa separatus", but rather "tamquam sanguis perfusus est per totum corpus orationis." The notion of *commoratio* as something spread throughout a speech may have led Ernesti to connect it with *diatribe*, for Aristotle (*Ars Rhetorica* III, 1418a27) writes of *διὰ τριβᾶς* spread throughout an oration⁵⁶). As we shall indicate below, however, Aristotle is writing about digressions in the sec-

56) Ernesti undoubtedly was aware of the differences in the terms which he cites (see above at footnote 2), and he must have intended for them to be interpreted as possible equivalents for *diatribe*, but not as synonyms for each other. In his description of *epimone* (126), for instance, he does not mention *excursio* or its synonyms, but he does include *commoratio in una re* from Cicero, *De orat.* III 52. We, therefore, should not assume that Ernesti necessarily thought that *commoratio* and Aristotle's *diatribai* were the same thing.

tion just mentioned, and so we should not make the mistake of assuming that *commoratio* and *epeisodion* (or *excursio* or *digressio*) are synonyms. That the two are not equivalent is also clear from Cicero, who distinguishes between *commoratio* and *digressio*. In *De oratore* 3, 202 (cf. Martin 135, note 3), for instance, the Roman orator, writing briefly about effective figures of thought, separately mentions “*commoratio una in re*” and “*ab re digressio*.” Quintilian (9, 2.4; cf. Lausberg 835) makes the same distinction, when he asks, “*Quae delectatio aut quod mediocriter saltem docti hominis indicium, nisi alia repetitione, alia commoratione infigere, digredi a re et redire ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traicere, quae relinquenda, quae contemnenda sint, iudicare?*” We shall treat *digressio* later, in a discussion of *diatribē* in Aristotle, but for the moment it is sufficient to note the distinction between *digressio* or *excursio* and *commoratio*. Further, perusal of the examples of *diatribē* given by *Peri methodou* reveals that the figure as understood by Ps.-Hermogenes cannot be identical with digression. The passages cited from *On the Crown* and *Against Meidias* may in no way be considered digressions, especially since they are the beginnings of the two orations.

Ernesti’s combination of *diatribē* and *commoratio*, on the other hand, has much to recommend it. At the very least we may point to the relationship between the two words, since both may have the connotation of spending time on something and thus denote “dwelling on the point”. *Epimone*, which we shall use interchangeably with *commoratio*, shares the connotation of spending time, for it can mean “tarrying” or “delay” (*LSJ* 647; cf. Thucydides 2, 18.3), as well as “dwelling on the point”. Thus, we easily may see how either of the Greek terms could have been the predecessor of *commoratio*, and also how *diatribē* could be an equivalent term for *epimone*.

We already have looked at one definition of *commoratio* (*Rhet. ad Her.* 4, 45.58) and at *epimone* as it appears in four rhetorical writings (see above after note 32). Before we draw any conclusions about *diatribē* and *epimone*, however, it behooves us to look further into definitions and examples of the latter. As I mentioned earlier (at note 32), *epimone* (*commoratio*) occurs as both a figure of diction and a figure of thought. *Commoratio*, for instance, is listed among the figures of diction by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4, 45.58), but with the figures of thought by Cicero (*De oratore* 3, 202; cf. Martin 135, note 3). Neither of these

works gives any reason for its classification. Lausberg (838) has made some attempt at explaining how *epimone* or *commoratio* could fit into both categories of figure. For him, *epimone* is a figure of thought when there is an accumulation of sentences (Satzhäufung), as this accumulation shows “gedanklich variierte (also nicht identische) Inhalte in der Ausdrucksform eines Gedankens (dem Satz).” Examples are provided from Phoibammon (Spengel III, 51.23), Tiberios (Spengel III, 74.11), and Isidore of Seville (2, 21.43; Halm 521). Phoibammon, whose definition of *epimone* as a figure of diction was quoted above (after note 32), for instance, defines the figure of thought by calling it the “πολλῶν ἐκφορὰ πραγμάτων, εἰς παράστασιν καὶ δήλωσιν ἑνός.” His illustration, based on the theme of showing that someone is “serious”, remarks, “καὶ νυκτὸς οὔσης μὴ καρτερῶν ἐπὶ εἶναι τῶν βιβλίων ἐγερθεὶς ἀνεγίνωσκε. σβασθέντος δὲ τοῦ λύχνου οὐκ ὤκνει καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν βαδίσειν, ἵνα τοῦτον ἄφη· ἄδειπνος ἐκάθευδεν, ἵνα μὴ πολὺ ὑπνώσῃ.”

Under *epimone* in Isidore we find another series of sentences, this time taking the form of the questions, “cui tandem pepercit? cuius amicitiae fidem custodivit, cui bono inimicus non fuit? quando non aut accusavit aliquem aut verberavit aut prodidit?” Tiberios differs somewhat from Isidore and Phoibammon in that the illustrations of his definition are quite brief. One of his examples was cited above in the discussion of *plethos* and to this we may add his second instance, “ἄγεις, ἐλαύνεις, διώκεις, σκυφαντεῖς” (which Lausberg lists under another kind of *epimone*, his third division). In the first illustration the *epimone* depends on a variation in nouns, while in the second the verbs, with their subjects (“you”) understood, satisfy only the minimum requirements for complete sentences. The apparent dependence on single words, whether nouns or verbs, tempts us to move Tiberios’ examples out of their classification as *epimone* involving sentences and into that of *epimone* using single words (Lausberg’s third division). In both cases, however, the individual words do occur in, and actually create, distinct sentences, and, thus, they do not correspond to instances like those in Alexander (Spengel III, 18), which employ a row of nouns within the same sentence. Tiberios’ illustrations, then, do fit in with those of the two other rhetoricians, but, unlike those men, Tiberios does not consider *epimone* a figure of thought, treating it instead among the figures of speech. This factor reveals a weakness in Lausberg’s system. Lausberg apparently has relied upon a modern classification,

based on his view of what the figure should be, and omitted to mention that his classification of forms of *epimone* in terms of figures of diction or of thought does not always agree with the opinions of his ancient sources. To his first group, by the way, we should add the anonymous *Schemata dianoeas* (Halm 72,21; cf. Caplan 374), which defines *epimone* as “latine repetitio crebra sententiae” and quotes the opening three questions of Cicero’s *First Catilinarian Oration* as its illustrations.

Lausberg next provides two categories encompassing *epimone* as a figure of diction (*figura elocutionis*). The first of these is the accumulation of “mehrgliedriger Satzteile” and is a figure of speech because it “belongs to” *adiunctio* (743; cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 4, 27.38). For his examples, Lausberg turns to Phoibammon (Spengel III, 47.25), Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.11) and *Anonymous II* (Spengel III, 176.8; see above after note 32). The definition and one of the illustrations of Phoibammon were quoted above (after note 32), and here we need add only the second example, which reports, “ὁ τὰ ἐμὰ λαμβάνων, ὁ διαβάλλον με πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων μοι πανταχοῦ τι ποιεῖ, ὡς δῆλον ὅτι μισεῖ με.” In Zonaios we see *epimone* described as remaining upon the same thing for the sake of amplification. Zonaios’ illustration reads, “εἰ γὰρ τὸ Βυζάντιον τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀφθαλμός, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ὅτι κράτιστον, ἕψας καὶ ἐσπερίον λήξεως σύνδεσμος, εἰς ἣν τὰ πανταχόθεν ἄκρα συντρέχει καὶ ὄθεν ἀρχεται.” Finally, *Anonymous II* gives a definition resembling Zonaios’ and cites part of the same example, with minor alterations. To these three instances of *epimone* formed with “sentence parts” we shall add the passage from Demosthenes’ *De falsa legatione* 259, mentioned as an illustration of the figure by Demetrius (280) in his discussion of *deinotes*. After defining *epimone* as the “ἐρμηγεία πλείων τοῦ πράγματος,” the critic quotes an abbreviated version of the following sentence: “νόσημα γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νόσημα δεινὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ πολλῆς τιнос εὐτυχίας καὶ παρ’ ὁμῶν ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον.”⁵⁷ The shortened form, of course, is the thought underlying Demosthenes’ rendition and shows how the sentence would have appeared, if it did not contain *epimone* and were not “deinon”. Demosthenes is the source for yet another illustration of *epimone* built from “sentence parts”. In his comments on the figure Alexander quotes

⁵⁷ I have quoted the Demosthenes text after G. Mathieu’s edition (III, Paris 1945; see note 54 above). Lausberg does not include Demetrius in his descriptions of *epimone*.

from Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* 74 (Spengel III, 18.6ff.; cf. Walz VIII, 441) the complaint, "ἐγὼ δ' ὑπ' ἐχθροῦ νήφοντος ἔωθεν, ὕβρει καὶ οὐκ οἴνω τοῦτο ποιούντος, ἐναντίον πολλῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν ὑβριζόμεν." The sentence in the oration continues, "καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν ἰερῷ καὶ οἱ πολλή μοι ἦν ἀνάγκη βαδίσειν χορηγοῦντι" (ed. J. Humbert and L. Gernet, Paris 1959, vol. 2), although Alexander does not include this section. Here the thought "I was assaulted by my insolent enemy" certainly has been expanded to stress the gravity of Meidias' offense, and to portray his bad character.

As was the case with Lausberg's first category, this second grouping leaves itself open to criticism. First of all, *Anonymous II* and Zonaios list *epimone* as a figure of thought, not as a figure of diction. Lausberg's classification would have been more accurate, if he had either mentioned this variation or avoided the distinction between thought and diction altogether, keeping only his divisions based on the use of sentences or "sentence parts". Our second criticism involves the idea that *epimone* belongs to *adiunctio*, since the two figures actually are not related. According to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4, 27.38), *adiunctio* occurs when the verb "quo res comprehenditur" is not put into the middle of its sentence, but instead is placed "aut primum aut postremum". This figure, so defined, certainly is rather different from *epimone* or *commoratio*. If we look at the examples of *epimone* provided by Phoibammon, Zonaios, and *Anonymous II*, we see that Lausberg apparently was misled by the form of the sentences given, which generally resembles those used to illustrate *adiunctio*. Phoibammon's first example, for instance, with its repetition of prepositional phrases may have reminded Lausberg of an *adiunctio* such as "deflorescit formae dignitas aut morbo aut vetustate" (*Rhet. ad Her.* 4, 27.38). The example cited by Zonaios and the anonymous work, on the other hand, can in no way be considered *adiunctio*, for the necessary verbal linkage is missing. Thus, while *adiunctio* may occasionally appear in passages illustrating *epimone*, the collocation of figures should not be taken as an indication of a necessary relationship between them.

Lausberg characterizes his third kind of *epimone* as the accumulation of individual words, a figure of diction, and he takes examples from Alexander (Spengel III, 17.28), Tiberios (Spengel III, 74.8), and *Anonymous I* (Spengel III, 147.19ff.). We already have quoted two of Alexander's illustrations (after note 32

above) of the figure, which he defines as dwelling “ἐπὶ πλεῖον” upon the same thought with amplification. Further, Tiberios’ description and cases have been treated in the discussion of Lausberg’s first classification. It should be emphasized here, though, that Lausberg includes only Tiberios’ second example under *epimone* involving sentences and puts the first example, composed of single verbs, into this third category. We have argued above that both examples fit into the “sentence” division, although, since the first illustration is composed of one word sentences, we also could place it into category three, with reservations, as a special case.

The third work given by Lausberg as an illustrator of his final division is influenced either directly or indirectly by Hermogenes. The author of *Anonymous I* writes that *epimone* is a figure in which “ἐφ’ ὧν ἰσχύομεν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα αὐτῇ.” The possible source for this remark is Hermogenes’ *Peri ideon* 285, 23–24, where we read “ταῖς γὰρ ἐπιμοναῖς ἐφ’ ὧν ἰσχύομεν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα.”⁵⁸) For its examples, *Anonymous I* cites Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* 298 and 63. The first of these was quoted in part above in our discussion of *plethos*. In reproducing some of *On the Crown* 63 as its second instance, *Anonymous I* seems to be related to Hermogenes, for it includes only that section which Hermogenes has (*P. i.* 286, 1–3), omitting the “τὴν πόλιν” (which is not in Demosthenes’ text), but retaining the “ἐξῆς” indicative of the incompleteness of the citation.

Once again we must point out a difficulty in the classification. Tiberios is the only one of the rhetoricians quoted for the third kind of *epimone* who lists it as a figure of diction. Alexander, Hermogenes, and *Anonymous I* all consider *epimone* a figure of thought. As we stated above, Lausberg, making a valiant effort to bring order to the material on *epimone*, apparently decided to organize his three groups according to a modern view, rather than strictly after his sources. In order to avoid confusion, however, we shall abandon the classification based on the type of figure and distinguish forms of *epimone* according to their involvement with sentences, sentence parts, or individual words.

Obviously, we have delineated all of the kinds of *epimone* because they have a bearing on our attempt to identify *diatribe*. We demonstrated earlier that *plethos* in *Peri methodou* cannot be *epimone*, although the two figures are related. Now we shall

⁵⁸) Concerning this passage and its relationship to *Peri methodou*, see Bürgi (*WS* 1931), 49–50.

reconsider the examples of *diatribe* cited by Ps.-Hermogenes to see whether the figure *diatribe* corresponds to any type of *epimone*.

The first illustration of *diatribe* and its underlying thought have been quoted and discussed above (see after note 1 and before note 54). There we indicated that the expansion was produced by the insertion of the clause “ἢ ... Μειδίας” and the infinitive phrase “οὐδένα... ἀγνοεῖν”, governed by οἶομαι. The only extension involving single words is the addition of “τῆν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν” to supplement the “τῆν ὕβρων” of the basic concept. Clearly Demosthenes is being redundant in appending a synonym for *hybris*. He also is dwelling on his point, when he brings in his audience through the clause and phrase mentioned and stresses the misbehavior of his adversary, thereby establishing the tone and theme of his *exordium*. Since the extension of the thought (or dwelling on the point) is accomplished primarily through sentence parts, we shall put the type of *diatribe* represented by *Against Meidias* 1 into Lausberg’s second category of *epimone*. Examples such as Zonaios’, with its phrases in apposition and clauses beginning with εἰς ἣν and ὄθεν, and Alexander’s third illustration from *Against Meidias* 74, which features the same kinds of development, justify this classification.

The *proömion* of *On the Crown* also contains *epimone* of the second type. As we noted above, section 8 of that oration shows us how section 1 might have looked without expansion, although the former still retains the clause ὅσῃν ... ὑμῖν and its correlative phrase τοσαύτην... ἀγῶνα, which are part of the extension of the thought underlying section 1. If we assume that the theme of *On the Crown* 1 is “I pray that your good will may be equal to mine and that you may avoid prejudice and obey the law”, we can see that this sentiment is enlarged through sentence parts. Thus, instead of saying just εὐχομαι or τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομαι, the orator adds πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις⁵⁹). The simple idea of praying that the jurors’

59) Wankel I, 108–109, lists parallels for this doublet, and he also notes, “nach Hermogenes ist das διπλασιῶσαι ὄνομα ein geeignetes Mittel, eine für das Proömium genügende, aber auch nicht auffällige Redefülle (περιβολή) zu erreichen: Inv. p. 107, 10–18 R”.

In his discussion of prose rhythm (9, 4.63–64 and 73), Quintilian cites this passage. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De comp.* 18; *Versus Rufini v. c. litteratoris de compositione et de metris oratorum* (Halm 577, 14–21). We should not ignore the possibility that considerations of sound and rhythm, as well as a desire to stress a point, have contributed to the expansion in *On the Crown* 1.

good will may equal Demosthenes' is expressed through a relative clause, *ὅσην... ὑμῖν*, matched to its correlative infinitive phrase, where the words *μοι παρ' ὑμῶν* help to reinforce the *ἐγὼ* and *πᾶσιν ὑμῖν* preceding them. Additional fulness occurs in the use of *ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελώ*, strengthened through its assonance, rather than a mere *ἔχω*, and in the pointed *τουτονί*. In this first half of the sentence, then, we have ample indication that Demosthenes is dwelling on his point by means of an expansion of sentence parts. The second half contains similar kinds of amplification. For instance, the orator begins his appeal to his judges' concept of justice by inserting the clause *ὅπερ... δόξης*, which utilizes a prepositional phrase to dwell on the piety and good repute that is expected of the jurors. Certainly the clause is not a syntactical necessity, for the infinitive *παραστῆσαι* has a subject and an object, *τοῦτο* and the phrases to which it leads. We, therefore, should count the *ὅπερ* clause as a sentence part added to let the speaker emphasize his topic. Further analysis of this kind would provide us with other illustrations of how Demosthenes expands and stresses his point. For instance, instead of only reminding the jurors that they should remember the laws and their oath to listen to both sides equally, the orator inserts the clause *ἐν ᾧ... γέγραπται*, another sentence part which is not strictly necessary. Nor is the prepositional phrase *πρός... δίκαιους* essential^{59A}). Both the clause and the phrase, however, allow Demosthenes to linger over his theme and thus help him to bring it strongly to the attention of his listeners.

These instances which we have cited are enough to justify our contention that the figure *epimone* is present in *On the Crown* 1. Further, it is irrelevant whether we follow Gregory of Corinth and assume that the *epimone* involves only the first half of the sentence, or whether, on the basis of the syntax, we insist that the whole sentence be taken into account. Either half of the statement could serve as an illustration of the figure, if we simplify the underlying thought by breaking it in two. In any case, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Ps.-Hermogenes has chosen examples of *epimone* to illustrate his figure *diatribē*. We, therefore, may assume that he has given the name *diatribē* to what most other rhetorical writers called a form of *epimone*, specifically the type developed through sentence parts, and that

^{59A}) According to Wankel I, 115, the phrase *πρός... δίκαιους* within this clause is "eine geläufige Form der Peribole".

Gregory of Corinth is at least correct in his assertion that *diatribe* involves *cola* rather than the single words found in *plethos* (see above after note 31).

There still remains the question of whether *Peri methodou* is unique in its application of the term *diatribe*. To provide an answer to this query we shall examine the relevant occurrences of *diatribe* in two other sources. The first of these is Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica*, III, 1418a27 (cf. Ernesti 83), which is the earliest use of *diatribe* with a connotation applicable to the present investigation. In chapters 13–16 of book III Aristotle writes about the disposition (*taxis*) of a speech, which he views as having four divisions (1414b7), i.e. introduction (*prooimion*), statement of the case or narrative (*prothesis* or *diegesis*), proof (*pistis*), and epilogue (*epilogos*). Chapter 17 and part of chapter 18 are devoted to the study of proof, with the chief emphasis on deliberative and judicial forms of oratory. Within this section Aristotle comments that the deliberative type of speech is *χαλεπώτερον* than the judicial form (1418a21). He includes among his reasons the tendency of deliberative to be concerned with “τὸ μέλλον”, while judicial deals with the past. Further, judicial, unlike deliberative, has the law as its starting point. The final contrast appears in the remark that a deliberative speech does not have “πολλὰς διατριβὰς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν. ἀλλ’ ἥμισυ πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται.” Naturally, we are tempted to identify *diatribas* with the figure *diatribe*, especially since the reference to the speaker and his opponent would seem to fit in with the notion of character stressed by Ps.-Hermogenes. Such an identification is difficult to maintain, however, in light of the advice that Aristotle dispenses in 1418a29–37. There the philosopher writes that, if one is at a loss, he should do what the Athenian orators and Isocrates do. He then explains what he means by citing the example of Isocrates, who “καὶ γὰρ συμβουλευὼν κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ’ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ” (1418a30–32). The attack on the Spartans comes, incidentally, in Isocrates *Panegyricus* (110–114), while the unfavorable references to Chares occur in the *De pace* (134 and *passim*)⁶⁰. Aristotle next extends his discussion briefly to *epi-*

60) On *De pace* 134, see M.L.W. Laistner (ed.), *Isocrates: De Pace and Philippics*, Edited with a Historical Introduction and Commentary (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 22, New York 1927), 122–123. Sandys, in Cope, *Rhetoric* III, 204, notes in identifying these references that the *Panegyricus* is a “λόγος συμβουλευτικός”, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens

deictic oratory, in which one must vary the speech by introducing episodes praising someone or something, such as those introduced by Gorgias (cf. Cope, *Rhetoric* III, 205; Martin 179).

Aristotle's examples seem to indicate that what he means by *diatribas* in 1418a27 is "digressions". Digression frequently is mentioned by later rhetorical writers as *parebasis*, *diexodos*, *digressio*, *excursus*, and a variety of similar terms, denoting "a description of a place, a person, an event, a myth or a legend" and serving "to bring a relaxation to the mind of the hearer".⁶¹) Of course, relaxation was not the sole purpose of digressions, for they also, for instance, could arouse emotion or procure the favor of the audience (cf. Quintilian 4, 3.1-17). The position of digressions and their connection with the body of a speech were topics of dispute among ancient rhetoricians. Cicero, for example, tells us that Hermagoras believed that a digression should come between the arguments and the conclusion of an oration, and that a passage so placed should be "a causa atque a iudicatione ipsa remotam". Further, this section should contain "aut sui laudem aut adversarii vituperationem" or "in aliam causam deducat, ex qua conficiat aliquid confirmationis aut reprehensionis, non argumentando, sed augendo per quamdam amplificationem."⁶²) Cicero disagrees with Hermagoras, observing that digression is not one of the parts of a speech and that praise and blame should not be separate but should be woven in with one's arguments (*De inventione* I, 51, 97). Quintilian also does not consider the digression one of the fixed parts of a speech, and he defines the *egressio* or *parebasis* as the treatment "alicuius rei, sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis, extra ordinem excurrens tractatio" (4, 3.14-15). What is important for our investigation here is the emphasis in Cicero and Quintilian on praise and blame, which we may take as corresponding to Aristotle's "πρός ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ", and the placing of digressions throughout an oration, just as Aristotle suggests for *diatribas*.

and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a "λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός", when it praises Athens (sections 21-98) and "digresses into the region of λόγος δικανικός", when it attacks the Lacedaemonians (110-114).

61) Leeman I, 49. For the terms, consult Martin, 89; Volkman, 164-167, and Lausberg 340, who list the ancient sources which I shall be mentioning.

62) *De inventione* I 51.97, quoted here from Hermagoras, *Fragmenta*, ed. D. Matthes (Leipzig 1962), I fr. 22a. *Vide* Fortunatianus (Halm 113. 15 ff.), Julius Victor (Halm 427.24 ff.), and Martianus Capella (Halm 487. 6 ff.).

Ernesti (83) may have realized that Aristotle was writing about digressions in 1418a27 (see note 56 above), for this passage is the only one which can justify his inclusion of *excursio* and *episodion* among his equivalents for *diatribe*. J. E. Sandys in Cope's commentary on the *Ars Rhetorica* (III 203) cites Ernesti, but adds an interpretation of *diatribas* as "'landing-places', where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatiate into a passing digression." For Sandys *diatribai* may be closer to the figure *commoratio* than to *digressio*, although Cope, on whom he relies, seems to have preferred to interpret them as digressions⁶³).

Simple dwelling on the point, however, is not what is taking place, for example, in the *diatribe* on the Lacedaemonians in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, mentioned by Aristotle. That passage clearly is a digression. Thus, we must reject *commoratio* (*epimone*) as an equivalent for Aristotle's *diatribas*, when the latter term is applied to this example. The references to Chares (*De pace*) cited by the philosopher, which never refer to the general by name but only talk about him anonymously, on the other hand, seem less likely to be digressions. Although the *De pace* is full of digressions (e. g. 41 ff.), most of the attacks on Chares (such as at 134) are rather brief and seem to qualify neither as digressions nor as instances of *commoratio*. Brevity, however, is not the antithesis of digression. Quintilian provides us with some very short illustrations of *digressio*, including (9, 2.56; cf. Lausberg 341) the remark "et adspexit me illis quidem oculis, quibus tum solebat, cum omnibus omnia minabatur," from Cicero's *Pro Milone* 12, 33. Thus, assuming that the Roman rhetorician is using an established tradition, we may apply his concept to the *De pace* and grant that slight departures from the main point may have qualified as digressions, and that, therefore, *diatribe* in its plural form in our Aristotelian passage is referring to digressions. In addition, we should bear in mind the likelihood that *diatribe* was not a technical rhetorical term for Aristotle, but rather was a

63) Sandys is relying on the following passage from E. M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis, Notes and Appendices* (London 1867), 359: "again in public speeches, there are few landing places, as it were, pauses in the main argument, where episodic and extraneous matter may be introduced; they admit, that is to say, of very few digressions, for which forensic speeches afford abundant opportunity; such as attacks upon the opponent, exculpatory or panegyric remarks upon oneself, or appeals to the feelings".

word chosen by him as indicative of a digression's tendency to linger over a theme apart from, but related to, the main topic of a speech⁶⁴).

The other significant uses of *diatribe* by a rhetorician occur in Menander's *Διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (cf. Ernesti 83)⁶⁵). Chapter 3 of that treatise provides us with several instances. Menander is discussing invocatory hymns (*kletikoi hymnoi*), and he begins by mentioning examples in which a deity is invoked "from many places". Then the rhetorician writes as follows (p. 34, 3.3): "τοῖς δὲ συγγραφεῦσι βραχυτέραν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα διατριβὴν ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ πολλῶν τόπων καὶ χωρίων ἀνακαλέσουσιν οὔτε ἐφ' ἑκάστου μετὰ διαγραφῆς, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ Πλάτων ὅσπερ ἐξηγουμένους τῷ εἶδει κέχρηται." For his illustration from Plato he quotes the *Phaedrus* 13, 237a, "ἄγετε δὴ Μοῦσαι λίγεια, εἴτε δι' ᾧδῆς εἶδος μουσικόν, εἴτε διὰ γένος τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἐπέσχετε τὴν ἔπωνυμίαν."⁶⁶) Menander then adds the observation that Homer "ἐν κλητικῷ χροῖται τῷ εἶδει μετὰ τῆς ἰσοσυλλαβίας," and he cites the prayer of Chryses in *Iliad* I, 37–38,

... ὃς Χρῦσῃν ἀμφιβέβηκας
Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην, Τενέδοιό τε ἴφι ἀνάσσεις.

64) The only other occurrence of the word *diatribe* in Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica* is in II, 1384b9, and seems to be a nontechnical usage, meaning "occupation or amusement" (cp. Cope, *Rhetoric* II, 82). Aristotle occasionally employs forms of the verb *διατρίβειν* in *Ars Rhetorica* in the sense of "dwelling upon" (see I, 1371b31; II, 1378b7; III, 1415b23; Cope, *Rhetoric* I, 223, II, 14, III, 175), and possibly this use has led some to think that *diatribas* in 1418a27 must refer to "dwelling on the point" and thus be *commoratio*.

65) For the text of Menander we shall rely on C. Bursian, *Der Rhetor Menandros und seine Schriften* (Abh. Bayer. Ak. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl., 16 pt. 3, 1882), 30–68; cf. Spengel III, 329–367. Problems concerning the authenticity of the treatise and of the second work, entitled *Περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (Bursian, 69–151), attributed to Menander, are discussed by Bursian, 1–29; J. Soffel, *Die Regeln Menanders für die Leichenrede* (Beiträge zur kl. Philologie 57, 1974), 100–104 (see also 92ff.). The *Peri epideiktikon*, incidentally, has only one example of *diatribe*, on p. 91.3, when Menander discusses a variety of *propemptikon* which has "πλεῖστα διατριβὴν ... περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια".

Kustas, "Diatribe", 10, and footnotes 32 and 33 on 11, lists most of the occurrences of *diatribe* and related verbal forms in Menander, but he neither discusses the passages cited nor realizes that *diatribe* in Menander apparently is a figure. Cf. Ernesti 83; *TLG* 1359.

66) I am quoting from Bursian's Menander here. The *Phaedrus* passage (ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1905, vol. II) actually reads, "Ἄγετε δὲ, ᾧ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ᾧδῆς εἶδος λίγεια, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικόν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἐσχετ' ἔπωνυμίαν..."

If we continue our survey of this passage in Menander, we encounter the remark that for a poet “ἐξουσία πλείων”, while for a prose writer “ἐλάττων” suffices (34, 4), where greater and lesser must refer to *diatribe*. The rhetorician next comments that a suitable style for kletic hymns would be one “τε δι’ ὄρας προιοῦσα καὶ κόσμον”, and that for that reason poets “τὰς διατριβὰς προσλαμβάνουσιν.” Almost as an afterthought, the phrase “σχήματα δὲ τὰ ἀνακλητικὰ ἀρμόττοντα” is added. Menander’s exposition concerning the kletic hymn finally concludes with what he terms a “not useless rule”. According to this rule (3.6), if a prayer follows the invocation (τῆ κλήσει), then “ἔτι ἐλάττων ἢ διατριβῆ” for both poets and prosaic authors. If, however, the invocation would be “ψιλή”, then the *diatribe* is “πλείων”.

Diatribe again occurs in connection with the greater and the lesser in chapter 4, where Menander discusses the valedictory hymn (*apopemptikos hymnos*)⁶⁷, which is found only among the poets. In this form “διατριβὴν δὲ ἐνδέχεται πλείονα,” not *elattona*, as in the *kletikos*, where we want the god to arrive as quickly as possible. The *apopemptikos* essentially wants the god to depart as slowly as possible and thus favors the longer kind of *diatribe* (4.3).

The *physikos hymnos*, which deals with a god’s “physical qualities” (cf. Burgess 174), offers more examples of *diatribe*. In his fifth chapter (p. 36) Menander lists Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato as writers of such hymns, and then he notes that the *physikoi hymnoi* are either expository or brief, depending upon whether their authors are dealing with known or unknown things. Thus, according to Menander, Plato tends to be brief, while the two poets expound at length. Adding another distinction, the rhetorician differentiates between those who present their material in riddles (i.e. the Pythagoreans) and those who present it openly (such as the three authors mentioned). Those like the Pythagoreans, further, need “βραχύτητα,” but the others require “πλείστην καὶ μεγίστην διατριβὴν” (5.4-5).

There are three other chapters in the *Diairesis ton epideiktikon* in which *diatribe* occurs. The first of these (chapter 6) concerns the *mythikos hymnos*, which Menander distinguishes from the *genealogikos hymnos* (6.1-4), and which seems to be less congenial to the *diatribe* than are other hymnic forms. After making a

67) On the *kletikos*, *apopemptikos*, and other types of hymns described by Menander consult Burgess, 174 ff.

remark which is corrupt in our text, the rhetorician writes (cf. Cope, *Rhetoric* III, 203), “ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία καὶ τοῦ κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν καὶ τοῦ περιστέλλειν τοῖς ποιητικοῖς κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς οὔτε κόρον οὔτε ἀηδῖαν παρίστησι – καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνωῶ ὡσαύτως[ὡς] ἔνιοι τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τινὰς ἀκαιίρους διατριβὰς – συγγραφεῦσι δὲ ἢ λογοποιοῖς ἐλαχίστη ἐξουσία” (6. 4–5). There follows a delineation of ways to present a myth, concisely but not baldly (6.5), terminated by the observation that one will not lack methods except for that one “*theorema*”, namely “ὡς διατριβὴ ἀπόδοφορος” (cf. 6.6).

Chapter 7, which describes the *genealogikos hymnos*, features one usage of *diatribe*. Menander tells us that most descriptions of the birth of a deity are contained in other types of hymn (such as the *mythikos*), although they have been found separately (7.1–2). Then he remarks that, if the *genealogikos* section is interwoven with other forms, then “length” must be allowed, but, if “καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶη τὸ μέρος, ὅτι βραχείας δεῖται διατριβῆς” (7.2). To this passage we shall append one final reference which turns up in Menander’s discussion of how one should praise a city on the basis of its habits or pursuits. In section 28 of that exposition (pp. 66–67; cf. Spengel III., 365) the rhetorician mentions *encomia* “τὰ μὲν κοινὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δ’ ἴδια καιρῶν” (67.1). The *idia* seem to be *encomia* connected with speeches made at festivals, assemblies, contests, or gladiatorial combats, while the *koina* are those which have no such “cause”. After making this distinction Menander writes (67.3–6) that it is necessary, accordingly, that “τῶν πανηγυρικῶν γε τὴν πλείστην διατριβὴν περὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἑκαστον ποιῆσθαι,” such as if there would be a festival or an assembly or a gathering for a contest (armed, gymnastic, or musical).

If we now try to determine on the basis of the passages cited what *diatribe* is for Menander, we first must take note of what it is not. Despite the fact that the examples in the description of kletic hymns are from addresses to deities, *diatribe* is not identical with invocation, for the terms *klesis* and *diatribe* are differentiated in 3.6 (p. 35; Spengel III, 335–336). Further, although we might be tempted to assume that *prooimia* or opening remarks of any kind are the favorite environment of *diatribe*, the use of the word in reference to passages which have no set position (cf. 4.2, 5.4–5, etc.) forces us to abandon that premise. It would have been interesting, of course, if all of Menander’s instances of *diatribe* had come from *prooimia*, as do the examples of

the figure in *Peri methodou*. Finally, we cannot claim that *diatribe* is the same as *epitheton*, since the term definitely is not connected with epithets in the section concerning praise of a city (p. 67. 3-6).

These negatives provide us with a beginning but with little else. Unlike the author of *Peri methodou*, Menander does not give a definite indication (such as a reference to *lexis* or *gnome*) that he considers *diatribe* a figure. The closest that he comes to any "hint" of his views is to mention poetic "κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατὰσκειναῖς" and then to state that he is not oblivious to the existence of "unseasonable diatribes" among the poets (6.4). The implication, certainly, is that *diatribe* belongs among the poetic ornaments, a position which is rather vague but which could mean that it is a poetic figure, and thus also a rhetorical figure. The employment of the plural *diatribas* here in chapter 6.4 and also in 3.4, however, would seem to point us away from an identification of *diatribe* as a figure such as *epimone* and possibly toward an understanding of the word as an equivalent for *digressio* or *parecbasis*, just as it seems to be in Aristotle. The content of Menander's remarks and examples, unfortunately, serves as inconclusive evidence, which again shows the close relationship between *commoratio-epimone* and *digressio* (see above at note 56ff.). Certainly the illustrations from Plato and Homer do seem to dwell on their respective points, if we take the underlying thought to be a description of some aspect of the divinities invoked. When Socrates calls on the "Μοῦσαι λήγειαί" in the *Phaedrus*, for instance, he dwells on the origin of the Muses' epithet. At the same time, however, he seems to be digressing into an etymological wordplay⁶⁸), rather than emphasizing anything strictly necessary for his theme. Chryses, likewise, in addressing Apollo, inserts two descriptive phrases which dwell on the god's attributes, but which essentially digress from the point at issue, the punishment of the Greeks. Since epithets and descriptive phrases are standard parts of invocations, however, we are making a fine distinction when we try to separate emphasizing something pleasing to a god from digressing into an ornamental pas-

68) Cf. G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam 1969, 82), who mentions the wordplay and notes that the listing "εἴτε ... εἴτε" is "a standing trait of epicletic hymns"; Eduard Norden, *Agnostos Theos, Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*, 145, note 3, and 146ff. on this trait.

sage. The distinction between long and short *diatribas* which Menander makes here (3.6) and his references to greater and lesser *diatribas* (4.2, 5.4-5, etc.), on the other hand, may give us a connection with digression, since *digressio* also is represented by long and short forms (see above after note 63). Thus, the brevity of *diatribe* in Menander's illustrations is no hindrance to identifying the figure with digression, just as it is no barrier to assuming that *epimone* is involved.

Still, we do have an example of *epimone* in which multiple descriptive phrases occur. This is found in Zonaios (Spengel III, 162.11), and it includes three phrases and two clauses describing Byzantium (see above on page 309). Unfortunately, Zonaios does not quote the rest of the sentence, and so we cannot discern whether the emphasis on Byzantium's attributes has any connection with the main thought. The existence of such an illustration of *epimone*, at any rate, gives us some basis for arguing that *diatribe* in chapter 3 of Menander could be the equivalent of *epimone* just as readily as of *digressio*, depending upon how strictly we expect such passages to adhere to the central part of a statement.

Perhaps one of the more persuasive arguments in favor of *diatribe* as *epimone*, however, should be the improbability of the appearance of a digression in the opening sentence of invocations beginning a speech (as in the *Phaedrus*) or a prayer (as in the *Iliad*). Further, since the other instances of *diatribe* in Menander do not have examples attached, we must depend upon chapter 3 to give us the firmest indication of what the rhetorician intended. Therefore, even though, in view of the frequent disagreements between rhetoricians noted by Quintilian and others, one author's *epimone* might be another writer's digression, the nature of the illustrations makes us tentatively inclined to identify *diatribe* in Menander with *epimone*.⁶⁹⁾

In concluding now our involved study of *diatribe* in Ps.-Hermogenes, Aristotle, and Menander, we shall again emphasize certain key points. First, *diatribe* in each of the three authors refers to a rhetorical device, which is either the figure *epimone* or a form of *digressio* (although Aristotle may not be using the word in a technical sense). Further, none of the comments by our ancient sources justifies the assumption that their use of the

69) This problem needs further investigation, which I will undertake in a future study.

term may be employed as a definition or illustration of the genre popularly called the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Ps.-Hermogenes' emphasis on the character of the speaker and the nature of the illustrations in *Peri methodou*, finally, are ample proof that his definition has no connection with the genre and has been misapplied by those who have attempted to tie the two together.

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